Out of Africa, Part III: Position of Russia
This article is the third of my series on Africa:
Out of Africa, Part I: Big Picture and position of the US released on April 15, 2025
Out of Africa, Part II: position of China and Africa & BRICS released on April 27, 2025
Out of Africa, Part III: position of Russia released on May 11, 2025
Russia – Africa Summit 2019, 2023, 2024
The most spectacular and important framework for the cooperation of Russia – Africa is the work within Summits.
The first Russia-Africa Summit was held on 23–24 October 2019 in Sochi, Russia, co-hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. 43 heads of state or government were in attendance.
Putin emphasized “state sovereignty” and Russian willingness to offer aid or trade deals “without political or other conditions”, said that “an array of Western countries are resorting to pressure, intimidation and blackmail of sovereign African governments,” against which Russia was well suited to help African states push back.
The second Russia-Africa Summit was scheduled for October 2022 in Addis Ababa, but was then rescheduled to 26–29 July 2023 in Saint Petersburg. I made a short analysis in August 20, 2023 | Summer Potpourri 2, August 2023
The Russia–Africa Partnership Forum will host its highly anticipated first Ministerial Conference from 9th–10th November 2024 at the Sirius Federal Territory in the southern coastal city of Sochi. The Russia–Africa Partnership Forum will host its first Ministerial Conference from 9th–10th November 2024 at the Sirius Federal Territory in the southern coastal city of Sochi. According official reports, this two-day conference will be under the patronage of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the programme includes a plenary session to be attended by officials, and also round tables and discussions focusing on aspects of declarations from the first and second summits respectively held in 2019 (Sochi) and in 2023 (St. Petersburg).
4th Russia–Africa: What’s Next? Forum to be held in Moscow. The 4th Russia–Africa: What’s Next? Forum will be held at MGIMO University of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 22 to 25 April 2025 with the support of the Roscongress Foundation. The Forum is a unique platform for promoting fruitful cooperation between Russia and Africa and maintaining open dialogue on a level playing field. The event is aimed at developing dialogue between the young people of Russia and Africa, promoting African studies, and cultivating a positive image of Russia on the continent. The programme will be attended by Russian and African officials and leading representatives of the business and expert community, development institutions, and the media.
After two high-level summits and series of ministerial conferences and several bilateral meetings over the past few years, Russia’s geopolitical influence has significantly risen and tremendously impacted on Africa’s economic development.
The main outcome of the summits was the signing of a number of declarations related to cooperation in the field of security, as well as memoranda of understanding between Russia and Africa. These documents are more likely to have political significance and demonstrate the parties’ willingness to deepen and detail cooperation, which in itself is a good result. The political and business elite views bilateral cooperation very positively. Speaking about Russia’s trade relations with African countries, it is worth emphasizing the steady growth in imports and exports.
Russian Federation – Alliance of Sahel States (AES)
The visit of the foreign ministers of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to the Russian Federation (April), within the framework of the first joint AES–Russia working session, is aimed at further reinforcing what are essentially allied relations between the Sahel alliance — comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — and Russia.
The foreign ministers of the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance-Confédération des États du Sahel, AES) were for a two-day visit in Moscow at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. According to the Malian portal Maliweb, this meeting is part of a broader ambition shared by the heads of state of both the AES and the Russian Federation to expand their partnership and political dialogue at the confederal level. At the same time, the session aims to place joint efforts at the forefront of diplomatic priorities, overall development, and defence — this, as referenced in the communiqué from the Confederation.
The Moscow working meeting constitutes an important step in establishing a cooperative relationship and a strategic partnership across all areas of mutual interest between AES and Russia, in line with the first-year Roadmap of the AES Confederation under Mali’s presidency. This working session, chaired by Mali’s chief diplomat, was dedicated to determining the format of the AES–Russia meeting and discussing issues of mutual concern.
The foreign ministers of Burkina Faso and Niger also stressed the importance and necessity of defining a methodology, approach, and common positions to enable productive exchanges with their Russian partners, all while addressing the hopes and expectations of the people of the AES confederation. Participants expressed their trust on multipolar world and new rules of the modern world order.
Russian cultural cooperation with Africa
Russia and Africa have moved one more step forward in their bilateral relations by establishing a cultural telebridge dedicated to the formation and development of the Museum of African Cultures in Moscow. The cultural telebridge between Russia and Africa was organized by the Russian-African Club of Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU) with the support of the Secretariat of the “Russia-Africa Partnership Forum” under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
The telebridge was held on three main platforms – in Moscow (Russia), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Yaoundé (Cameroon), and included participants from Morocco, Guinea, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Zambia, Burkina Faso, South Africa, and Egypt.
The main speakers of the telebridge included representatives of the ministries and cultural authorities of Russia and African countries, diplomats, museum specialists from Russia and Africa, private collectors, universities, NGOs and journalists. The need to expand humanitarian cooperation with African countries was specifically emphasized at the second summit of the “Russia-Africa Partnership Forum” as well as at the Russia-Africa Ministerial Conference held in Sochi in November 2024.
Russian military cooperation with Africa
In today’s multipolar world, Russia plays a key role. It is now important to finalize priorities in international affairs. The African continent is undoubtedly one of those main priorities. This also applies to the continuation of the line of military alliance with those who, are not afraid to show the flag.
Russia is now strengthening its presence in Libya, especially in the east of that country, in support of the Libyan National Army under the command of Field Marshal, Khalifa Haftar.Furthermore, in Libya itself, the Libyan National Army is in a position of strength and controls most of the country. This means that a return to that nation’s unity can be considered in the long term.
There is also a symbolic side to the issue. Libya’s unity was destroyed by NATO with the involvement of some other regimes and Libya’s leader and one of the main symbols of pan-African values, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, was murdered. Therefore, the return of unity to Libya will not only be of great importance for Libya itself, but also for the entire African continent. Muammar Al-Qadhafi, in this respect, always believed much more in African unity than in Arab unity.
There is no unity across the entire African continent yet. However, it is more possible for the proponents of pan-African values and a multipolar world to achieve new victories. Continuing this work will also remain a priority.
Russia has capitalized on anti-French sentiment and French withdrawals in the Sahel. The new Sahel alliance is poised to become “a vehicle for Russian influence in the heart of Africa.” Russia’s Africa policy has emphasized military engagement, drawing from its historical role as one of the largest arms suppliers to Africa.
Since 2018, Russia has also deployed private military contractors to 31 African countries. The most prominent of these is the Wagner Group, which moved into the Central African Republic in 2018 and expanded its presence across Africa in subsequent years. In return for a “regime survival package,” the Wagner Group — recently rebranded the Africa Corps or Expeditionary Corps — is seeking access to strategically important natural resources such as timber, gold, uranium, and lithium.
In May 2023, only months after expelling French troops, Burkina Faso’s military leaders hailed Russia as a strategic ally. Last December, Russia re-opened its embassy in Burkina Faso, which was shuttered in 1992. Moscow also struck a new military cooperation deal with Niger. In April 2024, 100 instructors from the Africa Corps arrived in Niger. Africa Corps personnel reportedly hope to take over the US base in Agadez, which US troops must now vacate.
In March 2025,The Kremlin reached a deal to train the Ethiopian navy as it seeks to increase its influence in the Red Sea and supplant the West in Africa. The Kremlin has pursued naval deals with Eritrea in recent years and may view Ethiopia as another potential avenue for gaining influence in the Red Sea. Russia also nominally reached an agreement with the SAF for a Russian naval base in Sudan.
It seems that Russia manages the preservation of military bases in Syria with the creation of new ones in Libya, Eritrea and in time, Sudan as well.
The Russian Africa Corps and Its Expanding Role in Libya
Background and Evolution of the Russian Africa Corps Following the demise of the Wagner Group, Russia needed a structured and state-controlled force to continue its engagements in Africa. The Russian Ministry of Defense formalized the Africa Corps, ensuring direct oversight while maintaining the paramilitary model pioneered by Wagner. This force now serves as a vital tool in executing Russia’s foreign policy agenda without the limitations of conventional diplomacy or international treaties.
Recent developments indicate that Russia is shifting military assets from Syria to Libya, strengthening its strategic foothold in North Africa. The significance of this move cannot be overstated, as it aligns with Russia’s broader geopolitical objectives, including energy dominance, military expansion, and diplomatic leverage against Western adversaries.
Libya has long been a battleground for competing global powers and the Africa Corps has positioned itself as a dominant force among foreign actors in the region. With the declining role of Western-backed factions and ongoing instability, Russia has seized the opportunity to cement its influence by offering security assistance, military training, and direct involvement in Libya’s internal power struggles.
Strategic Objectives in Libya Russia’s intensified focus on Libya stems from multiple strategic interests. Energy Control and Economic Leverage Libya possesses some of Africa’s largest oil reserves. By securing access to key oil production facilities, Russia can exert control over significant portions of the global energy supply chain. Military Expansion and Power Projection The deployment of the Africa Corps in Libya provides Russia with operational bases that enhance its reach across the Mediterranean. With NATO maintaining a strong naval presence in the region, Russia’s interest in securing a naval foothold in Libya is a direct countermeasure to Western dominance. Political Influence and Diplomatic Bargaining By backing key factions in Libya’s ongoing conflict, Russia ensures that any future government will have a dependency on Russian support. This positions Moscow as a power broker in North Africa, allowing it to negotiate favorable terms with both regional actors and Western adversaries looking to stabilize Libya.
Operational Tactics and Activities. The Africa Corps has adopted a multi-faceted approach to solidify Russia’s influence in Libya: Military Training and Security Assistance, Infrastructure Control, Covert Intelligence and Sabotage, Strategic Asset Transfers: military equipment and personnel have been relocated from Syria to Libya, reinforcing the Corps’ capabilities while reducing Russia’s exposure in the Syrian conflict.
If Russia establishes a permanent military presence in Libya, it would dramatically alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean. A fully operational Russian naval base in Libya would challenge NATO’s dominance and provide Moscow with a strategic launchpad for broader regional influence.
Russia’s Africa Corps is more than just a continuation of the Wagner Group’s operations; it is a deliberate and strategic extension of Moscow’s global ambitions. Libya, with its vast energy resources and geostrategic positioning, is a crucial piece of Russia’s long-term objectives. By consolidating its hold on Libya’s military and economic assets, Russia is shaping the future of North Africa in ways that challenge Western interests.
Western Response and Countermeasures. The United States, NATO and European allies are increasingly concerned about Russia’s long-term ambitions in North Africa. Western intelligence agencies are monitoring Russian activities closely, discussing about countering measures like diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions and potential military support for rival Libyan factions. One of the major challenges for Western powers is the lack of a unified strategy in Libya. Meanwhile, Russia continues to exploit this fragmentation, advancing its strategic goals with minimal resistance.
Russia has continued to expand its military presence in Libya as it relocates more assets from Syria. Russia is also establishing a new military base in Libya. It is important that the facility will be located at a distance of about 1,100 km from the Mediterranean coast, because the base will be inaccessible to aviation and strike groups of a potential enemy. Specialists of the Libyan National Army (LNA) are restoring the Muathan es-Sara air base, abandoned since the 1990s, where units of the African Corps of the Russian Armed Forces will be stationed in the future. At the moment, some of these formations are located at the Al-Jufra air base.
This is part of a broader plan to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies in Africa. Moscow may receive assistance in this from LNA leader Khalifa Haftar, whom the Russian side supported during the recent confrontation.
It is very interesting that not only an additional impressive Russian military contingent arrived in eastern Libya but also a number of representatives of the Syrian officer corps, in particular the Air Force. The Syrian Air Force was in close cooperation with Russian Air Force to the very end and continued to strike terrorists in Syria together with the Russian Air Force. Now, the military of the Libyan National Army is actively practicing with FPV drones, using the example of the Russian experience in the Special Military Operation.
Mali – Burkina Faso – Niger
The Kremlin’s equipment buildup in Mali is likely unrelated to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and instead part of the Kremlin’s plans to continue to consolidate control of the Russian military presence in Mali under the Ministry of Defense–controlled Africa Corps.
A Russian military convoy of over 100 newly arrived vehicles passed through the Malian capital on January 17, highlighting the simultaneous Russian military buildup in Mali. Open-source intelligence analysts Casus Belli and Tatarigami reported that the Russian convoy included close to 60 combat armored vehicles, most of which are used for patrol and mobile warfare. These combat vehicles included BTR 82, VPK-Ural, and Tigr model mine-resistant armored personnel carriers and other armored trucks. The column also included two T-72 tanks, two BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, two anti-aircraft cannons, and three artillery pieces. Casus Belli and Tatarigami claimed that this composition is consistent with a Russian expeditionary battalion-tactical group, which is a grouping size that Russia used in Syria.
Most of the equipment in Bamako came directly from Russia, not Syria. Flight and ship tracking data also shows numerous flights from Russia to Mali via Libya since December 2024 and Russian cargo ships that arrived in Guinea from Russia in January, either of which could have transported the equipment from reserves in Russia.
The three Foreign Ministers of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (Alliance des États du Sahel, in English as the Alliance of Sahel States, AES), embarked on a fresh trip to Moscow. Meetings, held in early April 2025, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov undoubtedly gave a strong boost to the AES relations, marking the latest new chapter in building sustainable security ties and economic cooperation. Ahead of the meeting, the Russian Foreign Ministry said the Sahel foreign ministers prioritized perspectives on regulating their political crisis as well as focusing on economic spheres.
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger currently run by military governments that have taken power in coups between 2021 and 2022, have formed an alliance known as the Confederation of Sahel States (AES). By creating their own bloc, it exposes Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) weaknesses and its long-term inability and incompetency to deal with regional problems, particularly rising security through mediation.
The French grouping later kicked out French and other Western forces and conveniently turned towards Russia for military support. Their foreign ministers visited Moscow on April 3 and 4 and hold meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at his invitation, the statement said.
“The Moscow meeting represents an important step in establishing strategic, pragmatic, dynamic and supportive cooperation and partnership relations in areas of common interest between the AES and Russia,” the ministries said. As a follow up, the early April meetings in Moscow, several critical issues are on the agenda: military assistance to fight growing terrorism, and efforts to strengthen political dialogue and promote concrete partnerships relating to trade and the economy in the region.
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have bilateral agreements with Russia. The three have offered complete access to exploiting their natural resources in exchange for military equipment and weaponry as well as military training. Burkina Faso signed a Memorandum of Understanding on nuclear energy with the State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) during the Russia-Africa summit held in St. Petersburg in July 2023.
Although Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have abundant human and natural resources, offering tremendous potential for rapid growth, there are existing deep-rooted challenges – environmental, political and security – that may affect the prosperity and peace of the region. Therefore, external support is badly required and which is why those three have to look up to Russia as their economic and security rescuer. The three are desirous to ensure their political sovereignty, engage in development which Russia has expressed interest to support.
Russia – Sudan cooperation
Russia and Sudan finalize Red Sea Naval Base Agreement. The agreement between Russia and Sudan to establish a naval base on the Red Sea is a culmination of nearly a decade of negotiations. The origins of this deal can be traced back to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s visit to Moscow in 2017, during which he expressed interest in strengthening ties with Russia amid increasing Western pressure and sanctions.
In November 2020, Russia and Sudan signed an initial agreement allowing Moscow to establish a naval logistics center in Port Sudan. However, the political turmoil in Sudan, including the October 2021 coup that ousted Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and the subsequent civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), delayed its implementation. Despite the instability, Russia has managed to maintain diplomatic relations with both factions, positioning itself as a key mediator in Sudan’s political landscape.
Putin’s Warships To Control Red Sea Routes? Russia Stuns U.S Amid Houthi Threat | Watch
Times Of India, February 13, 2025
With Sudan’s latest announcement confirming that there are “no obstacles” to implementing the deal, the agreement now appears to be moving forward. The base will reportedly host nuclear-powered warships and 300 Russian personnel, enhancing Moscow’s strategic presence in the region.
A New Era in the Red Sea. The completion of the Russia-Sudan naval base agreement marks a major geopolitical shift in the region. As Russia establishes a permanent presence in the Red Sea, it challenges long-standing Western maritime dominance and alters the balance of power in East Africa. Sudan, in turn, is leveraging global rivalries to secure its own strategic interests, while the West scrambles to counterbalance Russia’s growing influence. If the deal proceeds as planned, the Red Sea could become a flashpoint for intensified military and economic competition, setting the stage for further shifts in the global order.
The United States, China, and France already maintain naval forces in the strategically vital waters off the Horn of Africa. However, Washington and its allies have openly opposed Russia’s presence in the Red Sea, fearing it will disrupt their longstanding control over global trade routes and regional security operations.
Western powers, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, have played a significant role in Sudan’s instability through economic sanctions and political intervention. Western governments, through International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, pressured Sudan to cut fuel subsidies and implement austerity measures, further deepening economic hardship.
These policies increased public discontent and fueled armed conflicts, ultimately leading to the October 2021 coup.
Summary: Russia’s expanding military network in and around Africa
Many Russian political analysts see that the initiatives Russia already has with Belarus and the DPRK should be expanded and strengthened to all those states in Eurasia, Africa and Latin America that are ready for it. They appreciate especially those AES countries, which are under continuous pressure from the West.
Russia is now strengthening its presence in Libya, especially in the east of that country, in support of the Libyan National Army under the command of Field Marshal, Khalifa Haftar. This operation has also a direct link to the interests of Russian allies in the Sahel region—Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.Furthermore, in Libya itself, the Libyan National Army is in a position of strength and controls most of the country. This means that a return to that nation’s unity can be considered in the long term.
Russia has relocated some of its military personnel from Syria to Libya and is strengthening its presence through the “African Corps,” pushing further south into the Sahel and westward toward the Gulf of Guinea.
Satellite imagery analysis suggests that the Ma’aten al-Sarra airbase in southern Libya, near the borders with Egypt, Sudan, and Chad, is being reconstructed to support these operations. The base would enable direct flights without refueling to military airbases in Niamey (Niger), Loumbila (Burkina Faso), and Gao (Mali), as well as a potential future naval base in Port Sudan-though Russian sources claim no formal agreement has been reached for the latter. It appears that the Russians are attempting to establish a presence similar to AFRICOM-the US Africa Command.
In Libya, Russia is not only backing General Khalifa Haftar, whom it supported in his 2019 offensive against forces in Tripoli but also forging stronger ties with the tribal communities of Fezzan, a vast desert region stretching into Chad and Niger. This provides Moscow with not only a strategic foothold but also access to natural resources, including the gold mines of the Kalanga Mountains.
Recently agreed Russian naval base in Sudan is the latest achievement in Russia-Africa cooperation.
Beyond linking the Mediterranean and the Sahel, the next phase of Russia’s reorganization in Africa may involve blocking the South Atlantic route to Western countries by pressuring coastal nations in the Gulf of Guinea into this new Moscow-led sphere of influence
President Vladimir Putin has held close contacts with the President of Guinea-Bissau. Moscow also maintains strong relations with Equatorial Guinea, where around 200 Russian military instructors are stationed. Additionally, on the Atlantic coast, Côte d’Ivoire is closing the French military base in Port-Bouët, while Senegal is moving toward reducing the presence of French military bases in its territory.
The notion that African nations are being coerced into military cooperation with Russia is misleading. “Russia’s significant contribution helped stabilize and secure the Central African Republic. At the height of the crisis, we were abandoned… but Russia responded,” CAR’s Minister of Communications Maxime Balalou said in an interview with CNN.
From a broader strategic perspective, Russia’s actions align with historical continuity and economic interests. Russia’s ambitions in the region date back to the 18th century, when it established its Mediterranean fleet to secure the Black Sea straits from Ottoman incursions. While Russia’s role in Syria may evolve, it will not disappear. Instead, the shifting dynamics surrounding Syria’s role as a launchpad for African operations highlight Libya’s importance – not as a backup plan but as an integral part of Moscow’s long-term strategy to expand its strategic footprint and project power beyond its borders.