Arctic getting hotter
I have examined in details this topic in the article below:
June 1, 2021 | Strategic and military balance of great powers in Spring 2021
When examining broader geographical context, Middle East is full of powder kegs and political tectonics are moving swiftly there as well as Taiwan Strait or on South China Sea, where “freedom of navigation” can trigger flames at any time. Ukraine’s crisis is nearing the climax. But finally, we come to the question, where is the ultimate red line, and the answer is “arctic front line”.
My assessment is up north in the Arctic, the region, where Russia has huge natural resources, where China’s interests are growing (oil, gas, trade, Arctic Silk Road etc.), where profitable trade routes and data cable routes will situate, where Russia has strongest military fortifications and best know-how in Arctic issues (ice breaking, war fighting in Arctic environment etc.). When the US & NATO enter this region, they will face the ultimate red line of combined Russia & China there.

General features
The Arctic is the northern polar region of the Earth, including the outskirts of the continents of Eurasia and North America, the Arctic Ocean and adjacent parts of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
The Arctic region, still relatively unexplored, is recognized as a rich repository of untapped natural resources, particularly oil, gas, and marine life. It is also historically viewed as a potential flashpoint for great power conflict. The Arctic region is characterized by vast expanses of floating ice, with ridges that can reach up to 20 meters thick. The Arctic as a macro-region covers some 14 million square km and hosts as yet uncalculated reserves of hydrocarbons, precious metals and rare earths.
Unlike Antarctica, which is governed by a 1959 treaty allowing only peaceful activities, no analogous treaty exists for the Arctic.
Established in 1996, the Arctic Council addresses issues pertinent to Arctic nations, comprising the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. It is an intergovernmental forum that promotes cooperation and coordination between the Arctic States, Arctic Indigenous Peoples and other Arctic inhabitants, covering a range of issues – crucially, excluding military security.
Observer countries must acknowledge the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Arctic states while recognizing the extensive legal framework governing the Arctic Ocean. In May 2013, India became the 11th country to gain permanent observer status at the Arctic Council.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Arctic has been considered a politically neutral zone, marked by the peaceful international cooperation of scientists. But now the situation is changing significantly. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is considered a turning point in Arctic relations. At the time the war broke out, Russia had been chairing the Arctic Council. Seven of the eight Arctic Council members (all but Russia) promptly decided to boycott meetings over the war and only met again in 2023 to oversee the handover of the chairmanship to Norway.
Without Russia, which is so large that its northern border makes up 53 percent of the Arctic coastline, the Arctic Council faces criticism over its international legitimacy, as it can no longer claim to be separate from geopolitical conflicts. In 2024, Russia then suspended annual payments to the organization until the council’s full activities involving all members resumed. Some virtual meetings started up again last year with Russian participation.
Geography
Defining the border of the Arctic region is debatable. According to one approach, it runs along the southern boundary of the tundra zone, in which case its area is about 27 million square kilometers. According to another approach, the region does not extend beyond the Arctic Circle (66°33′ N) and its area is 21 million square kilometers (about 6% of the Earth’s surface). A third of this territory is land, a third is the continental shelf and the rest is the ocean with depths over 500 meters. Most of the ocean surface is covered by ice almost all year round.
Five countries have access to the Arctic Ocean basin: Russia, Canada, the USA (Alaska), Norway and Denmark (thanks to the island of Greenland, which is part of Denmark). The total length of the Arctic coast of these countries is 38,700 km, of which Russia accounts for 22,600 km. Arctic countries also include Iceland, which is located in close proximity to the Arctic Circle, as well as Sweden and Finland (significant territories of these countries lie within the Arctic Circle).
Oil and gas reserves, other resources
At present, there is no scientifically substantiated data on hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic. Experts assess all existing information on hydrocarbon reserves in this region as rather expected. The most authoritative are the reports of the international consulting company Wood MacKenzie and the US Geological Survey, published in 2006 and 2008, respectively.
Wood MacKenzie estimated undiscovered oil and gas reserves in the region at 166 billion barrels of oil equivalent and explored reserves at 233 billion barrels. According to the US Geological Survey, the total undiscovered oil and gas resources in the Arctic region may reach 412 billion barrels of oil equivalent, which is 22% of the world’s total undiscovered hydrocarbon resources, including 90 billion barrels of oil (13% of the world’s undiscovered reserves), 48.3 trillion cubic meters of natural gas (30% of the world’s undiscovered reserves), 44 billion barrels of gas condensate (20% of the world’s undiscovered reserves).
At the same time, 84% of the resources are located on the shelf of the Arctic Ocean and only 16% are on the land part of the Arctic states within the Arctic Circle. The largest reserves of natural gas are concentrated in the Russian segment of the Arctic, and oil – in the American. The region also hosts as yet uncalculated reserves of precious metals and rare earths.
Other resources. According to scientists, the Arctic contains a fifth of the world’s fresh water reserves. The continental part of the Arctic contains significant reserves of copper-nickel ores, tin, platinum group metals, agrochemical ores, gold, diamonds, tungsten, mercury, and ferrous metals.
In particular, the Arctic zone of Russia contains reserves of diamonds, gold, chromium and manganese, platinum group metals, etc. Gold, coal, and quartz are mined in Canada’s Yukon. In Alaska, beyond the Arctic Circle, industrial-scale mining is carried out at the Red Dog open pit, the world’s largest in terms of zinc reserves. In addition, gold is mined in Alaska and there are also reserves of uranium, copper, nickel, and iron. Coal, marble, zinc, lead, and silver are mined in Greenland. The gradual melting of ice, opens up new opportunities for the development of Arctic territories and the active exploitation of their mineral resources.
Arctic Sea Routes, new transport routes
Increasing ice melting has begun opening the Arctic region for longer periods of time in summer months. In this context, the navigation potential of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), the shortest route from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region and the Northwest Passage (NWP), connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans in the Western Hemisphere, are of particular importance. There are three main routes that could revolutionize the international commercial shipping industry in the 21st century.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) lies along the arctic coast of Russia. Ice clears up here first and therefore is available for longer. It also has the highest commercial potential: the route reduces the maritime distance between East Asia and Europe from 21,000 km via the Suez Canal to 12,800 km. It implies a transit time saving of 10-15 days. NSR was used extensively for natural resource extraction and transportation during the Soviet Era. In 2009, two German ships led by a Russian icebreaker made the first commercial journey across the NSR from Busan in South Korea, to Rotterdam in Netherlands, establishing good commercial prospects.
The North West Passage (NWP) is another route between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, crossing Canada’s Arctic Archipelago that was first used in 2007. It may open for more regular use soon. While Canada claims it as an internal waterway, the US and others insist it is an international transit passage and must allow free and unencumbered movement.
This route could reduce shipping time between the Middle East and Western Europe to around 13,600 km compared to 24,000 km via the Panama Canal, however parts of the route are just 15 meters deep, thus reducing its viability. China seems to be interested in using this passage to eastern parts of US, as the Panama Canal too has ship size and tonnage restrictions.
The third one is a potential Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) which could use the central part of the Arctic to directly link the Bering Strait and the Atlantic Ocean port of Murmansk. This route is hypothetical for now and may appear as climate change progresses.
Status of the Arctic
There is no single international document (similar to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959) that would establish the legal status of the Arctic territories. For a long time, the so-called sectoral principle of division was in effect in the Arctic. Currently, the Arctic is subject to regulation by the Law of the Sea (Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982), numerous multilateral and bilateral agreements and declarations, as well as the national legislation of eight Arctic states.
Sectoral division of the Arctic in the 20th century According to the sectoral principle, countries with access to the Arctic Ocean considered the meridians passing through the extreme points of their coasts and converging at the North Pole to be the boundaries of their polar possessions. Accordingly, the Arctic states considered the territories within the “polar triangles” to be objects of their sovereign powers. Sectoral delimitation was laid down in the 19th century. In particular, it was recorded in two conventions of the Russian Empire – in 1825 with United Kingdom on the delimitation of possessions in North America and in 1867, when Alaska became part of the United States.
Thus, the Arctic was effectively divided into five sectors of responsibility between the United States, Russia, Norway, Canada and Denmark. The concept of Arctic sectors was predominant until the 1960s and 1970s, when practical exploration and development of natural resources in the region began and non-Arctic states also showed interest in the Arctic.
Convention on the Law of the Sea The sectoral division of the Arctic was not confirmed in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which defined the boundaries of the maritime spaces in which coastal states have the right to exercise their sovereignty. The Convention extends its effect to all maritime spaces; it does not contain any special rules that would apply specifically to the Arctic. It established a 12-mile zone (22.2 km) as the limit of territorial waters and jurisdiction of coastal states over resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within 200 nautical miles (370.4 km) from the baselines.
The width of the continental shelf was limited to 200 nautical miles. Territorial seas, EEZ and continental shelf are the areas where coastal states exercise their jurisdiction and exercise rights to resource extraction, fishing and other activities.
Competition between Arctic powers is exacerbated by overlapping territorial claims on the seabed. Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) allows states to extend their continental shelf, but claims often overlap, as in the case of the North Pole, claimed by Russia, Denmark and Canada. Russia, in particular, has intensified its military presence in the Arctic, reopening Cold War bases and developing advanced naval and missile capabilities.
Greenland (part of Denmark), the world’s largest island, resides in the North Atlantic and Arctic Circle, occupying a position midway between North America and Europe. About 80 per cent of the island’s surface is covered by an ice sheet, second in size only to Antarctica. This ice sheet, which reaches thicknesses of more than 3,000 metres, is one of the planet’s main freshwater reserves. The rest of the territory consists of ice-free coastal areas, home to spectacular tundras and fjords.
Russia’s dominance
The Arctic is and will be significant for Russian economic development in the coming decades. Russia is taking actions to assert dominance as the country with the largest amount of land above the Arctic Circle and is defending its historic right to rule over the Far North, securing its territorial interests against those of NATO-aligned states. Moscow submitted a claim in 2001, revised in 2015, to extend its continental shelf northward from the boundaries delineated in the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Russia handed in new claims including 1.2 million square kilometers of sea shelf in the Arctic in 2015.
Extending its claim is a part of Russia’s latest Arctic strategy, which looks to extend its Exclusive Economic Zone claim to the continental shelf. Recent reports indicated that Russia is staging massive Arctic maneuvers and is amassing new military bases and testing advanced weapons on its Arctic coastline.
Moreover, Russia has overwhelmingly largest icebreaker fleet in the world, over 40 units.
World largest and strongest nuclear Icebreaker: Amazing Planet
Amazing Planet July 14, 2017

Military-political position by major players
Russia is the largest stakeholder in the Arctic. The Arctic region contributes approximately 10% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and accounts for 20% of all Russian exports. The Arctic has gained renewed significance in the 2023 version of the Kremlin’s Foreign Policy Concept, which emphasizes the preservation of peace and stability, increased environmental sustainability and reduced threats to national security.
Russia’s New Arctic Policy 2035, signed in 2020, explicitly asserts its sovereignty and territorial integrity over the NSR, much to the dismay of the United States, which advocates for the NSR to remain an international waterway under broader Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). Moscow has threatened to use force against vessels that do not comply with Russian regulations in the NSR.
Russia has operated nuclear-powered icebreakers in the region for some time. Although the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) agreement between Russia, the US, and Norway facilitated the decommissioning of certain Soviet and US assets, the increasing interest from additional nations has sparked a new Cold War dynamics between the two primary powers. The cooperative atmosphere that once prevailed has deteriorated, particularly in light of geopolitical tensions stemming from the situation in Ukraine since 2014.
The Arctic Institute note that Russia’s control of the North Sea Route (NSR) would give an “economic and diplomatic lever with which to extend their regional influence”, highlighting how the Russian Northern Fleet has increased its surface and underwater of the route. The US Department of Defense takes a stronger rhetoric, stating in its 2024 Arctic Strategy that Russia’s maritime infrastructure could allow it to enforce “excessive and illegal maritime claims” along the NSR between the Bering Strait and Kara Strait in the future.

Russia has a larger military presence in the Arctic than NATO and has been investing in and upgrading its Soviet-era facilities. However, these investments seem to be mainly of defensive in nature and the Kremlin is not interested in starting a conflict in the Arctic. Moscow is rather pursuing economic ambitions, protecting its second-strike nuclear capabilities and projecting power into the Central Arctic, Bering Sea and North Atlantic.
Beginning in 2010, Russia has invested about $2 billion to refurbish 13 airfields, enhance search and rescue capabilities and upgrade radar stations to improve awareness in the air and maritime domains, including S-400, Bastion-P, Pantsir-S1 and Sopka-2 radar and air defense systems. These systems create a “protective dome” across Russia’s vast Arctic coastline and improve its overall operational ability to detect and track vessels and aircraft. These systems give Russia almost complete coverage of its northern coastline and adjacent waters as well as increased power projection capabilities in the Barents Sea highlighting its ability to deny aerial, maritime or land access to NATO or US forces.
Russian Defense Ministry’s military construction complex has built nearly 1000 buildings and structures for land, sea and air forces as well as for its fleet of nuclear- and conventionally-powered icebreakers in the Arctic since 2013.
Arctic strategy centered on coastal and air space defense and protection of maritime trade routes. Regional defense capabilities greater than all other Arctic powers combined, with over 100,000 troops permanently stationed in over 40 bases, locating at Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya and Wrangel Island. Major Army units include the 12,000 troops of 200th and 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigades and the 10,000 troops of Arctic Coastal Defense Forces, MiG-31 jets, S-400 and Bastion air, missile and coastal defense systems and early warning sites deployed. In addition, Northern Fleet’s Borei and Yasen class nuclear-powered submarines, diesel-submarines and surface combatants patrol the area as well as over 40 nuclear and diesel icebreakers aid power projection.
As a show of force in Arctic capability, three Russian nuclear-powered submarines simultaneously surfaced from under the ice at a distance of up to 300 meters from each other for the first time in history during Arctic drills in March 2021. Russia’s supersonic fighter MiG-31BM destroyed targets (as simulating bombers) with hypersonic missiles in the stratosphere in the Arctic Circle. The target was attacked from a height of about 20.000 meters and at a speed of Mach 2.5. The “enemy” was destroyed at a distance of several hundreds of kilometers.
NATO too has carried out drills and increased its might in the arena, with the addition of Sweden and Finland to the group last year. The US DoD says it is monitoring developments and improving surveillance and early warning systems in the vast region to “ensure the Arctic does not become a strategic blind spot.” Data published by Foreign Policy illustrates how in Europe, Norway has 13 Arctic bases, including a new addition, Camp Viking, a UK training ground for Royal Marines Commandos.
The US’ strategy focused on missile defense, intelligence-gathering and surveillance and since recently, a new effort to back up shelf claims against neighbors. The US has two aging Arctic-ready icebreakers, the Polar Star and the Healy, but 3 new cutters under construction. Air and missile defense capabilities in Fairbanks and Anchorage, Alaska and Thule, Greenland. Army, Navy and Coast Guard sites at Fairbanks, Delta Junction and Kodiak. About 25,000 permanently stationed troops.
This source shows the US to have nine bases in Alaska in addition to those in Greenland and Iceland. Despite President Donald Trump’s reiteration of wanting to buy Greenland, Washington has said it has no plans to increase the US’ current military footprint there. Observers note that continued tensions and military buildup on both sides has the increased risk of miscalculation.
Canada’s “Sovereignty assertion” focus of military patrols, investment and international legal claims. Operates CFS Alert – the northernmost permanent base on Earth, on Ellesmere Island, plus Joint Task Force North HQ in Yellowknife, Nanisivik Naval Facility, CFB Goose Bay, four RCAF airfields, and early warning radar operated under NORAD. 200-500 troops stationed in the Arctic at any given time. Troop numbers go up during annual “Operation Nanook” wargames. Fields seven heavy and medium icebreakers and building two more.
Canada has approved a 20-year, $1.86 billion spending spree on military support hubs in Nunavut and the Northwest Territories. The money will be spent on airfields, logistics bases and new equipment.
Denmark. Arctic strategy focused on sovereignty assertion in Greenland, the Faroe Islands and the Arctic shelf via ground and naval patrols. 200-300 troops stationed in the Arctic at any given time (plus 500 rotating personnel). Permanent presence at Joint Arctic Command in Nuuk, Greenland in addition to Sirius dog sled special forces excursions on the island. No Arctic icebreakers, but three Knud Rasmussen-class patrol vessels.
Norway. Arctic strategy prioritizing role as a NATO forward base for ops against Russia, built on regular bloc ground, air and naval drills. About 3,500 permanent Arctic troops with Brigade Nord, Porsanger Battalion and Finnmark Land Defense. Air bases at Evenes, Andoya and Bardufoss, and naval facilities at Sortland and Bergen. Two icebreakers, plus three ice-capable patrol vessels.
Finland & Sweden. No Arctic shelf claims of their own but do possess land above the Arctic Circle. Strategies focused on sustaining military presence in the high north and abetting NATO. Sweden has three Arctic bases, plus an Arctic patrol air base at Lulea, Saab GoldenEye AEW&C patrols and a contingent of snowmobile troops. 5,000 troop permanent presence. Finland maintains the Jaeger Brigade of Arctic infantry in Lapland, a string of bases along the northern border with Russia, and the Rovaniemi Air Base for regional air ops. 3,000 active-duty Arctic troops, expandable to draftees in an emergency.
Arctic ambitions by great powers
Russia has long maintained a dominant presence in the area. However, NATO’s expansion northward has compelled Moscow to significantly increase its military footprint. Both Russia and the United States have long maintained military bases and surveillance systems in the Arctic, including nuclear deterrent capabilities. Growing power China has shown an escalating interest in Arctic affairs, while India, despite its geographical distance, has also established a foothold in the region.
The US claims
The United States, which gained access to the Arctic by purchasing Alaska and the Aleutian Islands from Russia in 1867, is currently the only Arctic country that has not ratified the Convention on the Law of the Sea. In December 2023, the United States unilaterally announced the expansion of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, including in the Arctic and the Bering Sea.
According to a map published on December 19 on the State Department website, the US shelf was expanded to 350 nautical miles from the baselines in the Arctic and to 340 nautical miles in the Bering Sea. As stated by the State Department, the US determined the limits of its shelf “in accordance with customary international law, as reflected in the relevant provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.”
Russia did not recognize the change in the boundaries of the continental shelf announced by the US.
American ambition on Greenland. The United States, initially less active, has recently increased its strategic engagement in the area, seeing Russia and China as challengers for control of resources and routes. China, despite having no Arctic borders, has invested in the “Polar Silk Road”, promoting infrastructural and scientific cooperation with Arctic countries.
Trump very soon after his inauguration spoke of Greenland and the annexation of the landmass. For what reason? After winning the presidential election in November 2024, Donald Trump proposed that Canada become the 51st US state and again brought the acquisition of Greenland from Denmark to the fore. (In 2019, he already announced his intention to buy it). Political scientists note that the accession of Canada and Greenland, which have access to the Arctic Ocean basin, is part of a plan to expand the American presence in the Arctic.
Greenland is the largest island in the world and corresponds to 22% of the territory of the United States, with only 60,000 inhabitants. It is part of the Kingdom of Denmark but has extensive autonomous powers.
According to a report by the US Geological Survey, 13% of the world’s oil resources and 30% of its gas resources, plus gold, rubies, diamonds, zinc, iron, copper, palladium, rare earths and a lot of uranium, are found underground (between dry land and seabed relevance), with an estimated total value of around USD 400 billion, a year’s GDP for Denmark.
There are already several undisclosed American military bases there, except for the well-known one in Pituffik, which is the centre of the entire NORAD space protection network. There is no doubt that the main strategic weight of the icy island is geo-strategic being part of the North Pole and controlling access to the Pole for the entire Southwest. On the other hand, the United States is only considered a polar nation for a part (north) of Alaska, which was once Russian land bought by the Americans. For Trump’s America, there are no small diplomatic advantages: the Arctic Council established in 1991 now has all NATO member countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the United States), except Russia, which is an eminent member but is the subject of war conflict and is kept on the sidelines at the decision-making level. The accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO was a key step in securing the Arctic War. In particular, with Finland and secondarily Sweden, one of the most important Russian bases in the Arctic, the Kola Peninsula, is directly threatened.
Russia’s Arctic ambitions and the China Factor
With increased US confrontation against both China and Russia, these two powers have fostered greater cooperation and coordination in Arctic matters.
When Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, governments expected Russian Arctic energy projects to grind to a halt. In reality, Russia’s Arctic ambitions are not just surviving – they’re evolving, largely thanks to a deepening partnership with China. This resilience underscores the strategic importance Russia places on its Arctic resources and the increasing limitations of sanctions in a globally interconnected economy. In fact, the China factor was created by Western sanctions.
The Arctic LNG 2 liquefied natural gas project offers a perfect example of Russia’s priorities and adaptability. Despite sanctions causing Western and Chinese partners like TotalEnergies, JOGMEC, CNOOC, CNPC and Mitsui to declare force majeure, Novatek, Russia’s second-largest natural gas company which is leading the effort in the Arctic, has found ways to keep the project moving forward.
When sanctions cut off access to Western gas turbines from Baker Hughes, Novatek swiftly pivoted to Chinese supplier Harbin Guanghan. While they had to alter the design of liquefaction unit Train 1 and operate it at a lower capacity temporarily and completely change liquefaction unit Train 2 to an all-electric configuration, the project is still advancing without Western support. Novatek is using profits from its successful Yamal LNG project to continue funding Arctic LNG 2, creating an internal financing mechanism that helps insulate the project from external financial restrictions.
Shipping challenges proved to be an additional barrier, but ultimately were not sufficient to deter Novatek. Sanctions have slowed the construction and delivery of ice-capable Arc7 LNG carriers manufactured in South Korea. In the meantime, Russia has optimized existing carriers from Yamal LNG and plans to use ship-to-ship transfers to keep them on track to complete the project by 2026.
At the heart of Russia’s Arctic energy strategy is Rosatom, the state nuclear corporation that has largely evaded Western sanctions and was the entity commissioning the infrastructure servicing the Arctic LNG 2 project. Rosatom’s role in Arctic energy development goes beyond its nuclear expertise; it has been granted almost total control over the Northern Sea Route, critical for transporting Arctic oil and gas. Its recent acquisition of Fesco, one of Russia’s largest shipping companies, gives Rosatom the ability to accept payments in Chinese yuan for energy-related transactions, effectively sidestepping Western financial sanctions on dollar and euro payments.
The relative immunity of Rosatom to sanctions has created a significant loophole in the West’s strategy to curb Russian Arctic energy development. The US is still the biggest buyer of Russian uranium fuel annually and Russia supplies nearly half of the global nuclear fuel market. This dependence makes it politically challenging to impose comprehensive sanctions on Rosatom, inadvertently providing Russia with a powerful tool to support its Arctic energy ambitions.
Cut off from Western technology, Russia is doubling down on developing its own Arctic-capable technologies, potentially making it more self-reliant in the long run. Western sanctions, while creating challenges, have had some unintended consequences. They’ve pushed Russia and China closer together in the Arctic, potentially creating a more solid alliance than before.
China’s deepening involvement in Russia’s Arctic endeavors has become a crucial factor in Moscow’s ability to weather Western sanctions. As Western companies withdraw from Russian Arctic projects, Chinese firms are stepping in, providing much-needed investment and technological support. This support aligns with China’s own Arctic ambitions.
Despite not being an Arctic state, China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” and is leveraging Russia’s isolation to expand its footprint in the region. Chinese companies maintain significant stakes in key Russian Arctic energy projects, with combined holdings of 30 percent in Yamal LNG and 20 percent in Arctic LNG-2.
While this Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic helps Russia bypass Western sanctions, it’s raising concerns among A7 countries – the seven Arctic Council members without Russia – about China’s growing influence in the region and the long-term implications for Arctic security.
China – a new Arctic player
While China does not possess land above the Arctic Circle, it considers itself a “Near-Arctic Nation” and, since 2014, holds observer status at the Arctic Council. The Arctic is becoming a potential contested space where great power rivals, the US, Russia and China, seek to use military and economic power to gain and maintain access to the region.
China, which considers itself a “Near-Arctic State,” seeks to be a stakeholder in the Arctic. In January 2018, China released its official Arctic Policy paper, highlighting its interests in Arctic resources and the need to develop infrastructure for research, military, and other purposes.
China invests more than the United States in Arctic research and operates a Polar Research Institute in Shanghai. It possesses a fleet of research vessels and two MV Xue Long icebreakers. Additionally, China established the Arctic Yellow River Station in 2004. In 2018, COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited, based in Shanghai, made eight transits through the Arctic between Europe and China.
For the North Pole, bordering Siberia, the Chinese plan to develop their Polar Silk Road, a strategic alternative to avoid the South-East Asian straits (then Bab el-Mandeb, Red Sea, Suez) and also shorten the crossing time to Europe. China’s “Polar Silk Road,” launched in 2018 as a joint initiative with Russia, aims to enhance connectivity in the region.
Like Russia, China also aspires to deploy nuclear-powered icebreakers in the Arctic, becoming only the second country to do so. However, Denmark, encouraged by the United States, rejected China’s offer to purchase an old military base in Greenland and build an international airport there.
India’s interest
As a rising major power, India aims to become a significant player in the Arctic. It has operated the “Himadri” permanent Arctic research station in Svalbard, Norway, since July 2008. Svalbard, the northernmost year-round settlement on Earth, has a population of about 2,200 and is nearly 1,200 kilometers from the North Pole.
India’s Arctic policy, titled “India and the Arctic: Building a Partnership for Sustainable Development,” was released in March 2022. This document outlines India’s interests, which include economic and resource prospects, sea connectivity, and reinforcing its presence in the region.
The Arctic becomes increasingly important for New Delhi as it seeks to expand sea trade routes to access more markets for its growing exports, and secure passages for shipments of oil and other vital commodities.
Both India and Russia have made significant progress in promoting the 7,200 km International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that could move freight between India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia and Europe, greatly reducing cost and time, as well as the Chennai-Vladivostok corridor, which could become a part of NSR.
Recent developments indicate that New Delhi is engaged in discussions with Moscow regarding the construction of icebreakers at Indian shipyards, highlighting India’s commitment to Arctic engagement and the potential for expanded cooperation.
The next great game
The Arctic region continues to attract researchers, as “the next great game” unfolds. Unlike Antarctica, Arctic states possess established territorial claims under the Law of the Sea regime. Consequently, discussions surrounding great power politics, competition and conflict in the Arctic are increasingly capturing the attention of strategic analysts.
Russia’s Northern Fleet is strategically positioned across the Arctic and holds a dominant stance in the region. The US became an Arctic state following its purchase of Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million in 1867. Canada and Northern European nations have substantial stakes in Arctic affairs, prompting the US to deepen its alliances with these countries.
Notably, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) offers a transportation route that is 37% shorter for cargo traveling from London to Yokohama, Japan, compared to the Suez Canal. Russia seeks to leverage this advantage economically through a robust support infrastructure along its Arctic coastline. Moscow perceives the US and its NATO partners as threats to its Arctic ambitions.
As the great Arctic race progresses, Russia’s resource-driven economy leads in exploitation efforts, having secured rights to approximately 1.7 million square kilometers of seabed. Moreover, Russia has revived several Soviet-era military bases and modernized its naval capabilities, now operating seven nuclear-powered icebreakers alongside over 30 diesel-powered vessels. In contrast, the US and China each operate only two diesel-powered icebreakers. NATO has also intensified military exercises in the Barents Sea and Scandinavian regions.
China views the Arctic as a vital source for energy and minerals, while India hopes for a collaborative regional approach rather than conflict. Nonetheless, the intensifying global competition between the US, Russia, and China is already manifesting significant consequences.
For further reading
US Department of Defense
US Department of Defense: 2024 Arctic Strategy
The Arctic Institute, article by Kiel Pechko, January 7, 2025:
Rising Tensions and Shifting Strategies: The Evolving Dynamics of US Grand Strategy in the Arctic
SWP comment / Janis Kluge and Michael Paul
Russia’s Arctic Strategy through 2035
Grand Plans and Pragmatic Constraints
Russia Maritime Studies Institute, October 26, 2020
STRATEGY for Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Provision of
National Security for the Period up to 2035
NATO Defense College, June 25, 2021, Document Review
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China published a white paper titled “China’s Arctic Policy” on January 26, 2018. Following is the full text of the white paper: