Written and analyzed by: Dr.Nadia Helmy  Article 1  March 6, 2021

Cairo, Egypt  

Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and

Economics / Beni Suef University- Egypt. An Expert in Chinese Politics, Sino-Israeli Relationships, and Asian Affairs- Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES)/ Lund University, Sweden- Director of the South and East Asia Studies Unit

Abstract

The thesis of our study is briefly highlighting the problem of the incursion of terrorist and fundamentalist movements between Pakistan and India, and the mutual accusations between them about striking and targeting targets such as those by terrorist elements. This was what imposed itself recently in February 2018, especially after the Indian military basein the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir was attacked by an armed attack, which led to the fall of a number of Indian victims. 

From here the tension between India and Pakistan returned to its head again, and the attempts of the Indian prime minister Narendra Modi to benefit from the “influence of the Indian lobby at Washington to practice pressures on the USA to stand with India against Pakistan and China to fight terrorism”, while the biggest and most dangerous disaster related to the confrontation patch in which China could clash with its neighbor India and between this and that we see an American role that is almost seeking to ignite confrontation between all parties with the encouragement of the “Indian lobby” in Under the US desire to contain and restrict China in South Asia and India and the Chinese response as Beijing is attempting to defend its interests in Pakistan and its project of the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) and the Chinese “Gwadar Port” in Pakistan within the framework of the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative”, at a time when Beijing’s interests are exposed. 

The threat of terrorism and fundamentalism targeting Chinese internal interests in Xinjiang,the Muslim Uighur region in northwest China, and its extensions with terrorist elements and militias in South Asia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and on the borders between Pakistan and India, which led to targeting terrorists and striking China’s interests in Pakistan. Here, the security, political, and strategic conflict began between China and the United States and their allies Pakistan and India, with each side accusing the other of sponsoring terrorism.

Hence, each of the previous parties tried to use strategies and tactics to respond to the other side, for example India, through the Indian Lobby in Washington, tried to influence the US administration to confront the fundamentalist tide from Pakistan. India also submitted requests to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to include Pakistani groups and classify them in the Terrorism list in the United Nations Security Council, but China used the right of veto against the Indian request, while Washington presented a proposal to form “Asian NATO”, directed mainly against China and Pakistan, accusing them of the growth of terrorist elements in the Asian region, with China officially defending its ally Pakistan that has denied charges it has harbored or supported terrorists.

Thus, we find ourselves in front of a network of intertwined and contradictory relations between all parties, which was exploited by terrorist and fundamentalist groups to carry out terrorist attacks against both China’s interests in Pakistan and hit its projects within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, in addition to India’s exposure to several internal attacks, the most difficult of which was in the beginning of 2018 and India accusing members of the “Army of Muhammad armed terrorist group” or as Know “Jaish-e-Mohammed” (JeM) in Pakistan of being responsible for the attack, the United States standing by India and threatening former US President Trump to cut off military aid to Pakistan, and “China’s defense of its ally Pakistan for its strategic importance to Chinese economic interests” that have already hit by several terrorist attacks in Pakistan. 

Hence, the study carried out by the Egyptian researcher seeks to study all these security problems and difficulties facing all parties, with drawing a general vision and future scenarios for how the shape of the confrontation between Washington and Beijing and then between India and Pakistan will be evolved, and the extent of the success of these extremist armed and terrorist groups in achieving their goals to strike and targeting the interests of all the concerned parties.

• Keywords: Indian Lobby, lobbies, lobbying, policy making, pressure groups, American Administration, fundamentalism tide, terrorism, terrorist groups, combating and fighting terrorism, Pakistani extremist movements, extremist movements extensions, Belt and Road Chinese Initiative (BRI), Indian Lobby, American security rapprochement, Washington’s policies and strategies, Chinese response, Future scenarios and expectations. 

Prologue

The study contributes to the extensive literature on influences by “conceptualizing of the Indian Lobby to pressure on the American administration” regarding fighting terrorism and combating fundamentalism tide in India, and the mutual accusations between the two sides Pakistan and China and the other side India and the United States of America of supporting terrorism in order to achieve their interests. 

We find that the US position was more biased with India against Pakistan on the issue ofits war with terrorism, as the former US president Donald Trump reduced themilitary aid package to Pakistanin August 2017, while prominent American officials criticized them for cutting aid. If the nuclear-armed state did not show greater cooperation in the field of preventing militants from using their lands as a safe haven for them.Supporters of the US decision to reduce aid say that“Pakistan sees militants like the Taliban as useful tools to curb the influence of its historic foe, India” ⁽¹⁾.

On the other hand, Pakistan denies allowing militants to take refuge in its territory, noting that“Pakistani government is always taking measures against these groups”. China views terrorism, separatism and extremism as posing potential threats to a wide range of national security interests that include social stability, national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Terrorist incidents appear to have risen significantly towards China internally and internationally at Xinjiang and the around its periphery and regional areas like Pakistan, as Chinese authorities expressed their fears towards Uighur separatists could use these areas as staging grounds for attacks against China or link up with Islamic radicals already operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan which are the primary focus of Beijing’s efforts in this regard ⁽²⁾.

Both India and China have engaged in joint counter-terrorism exercises. In May 2015, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China, both the countries reiterated their strong condemnation of and resolute opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and committed themselves to cooperate on counter-terrorism. They agreed that there is no justification for terrorism and urged all countries and entities to work sincerely to disrupt terrorist networks and their financing, and stop cross-border movement of terrorists⁽³⁾.

But here we find theChinese stance in support and support of the government of Pakistan against Washington and India, and this is illustrated by the words of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying,and her assertion that“Pakistan was on the front lines in the struggle against terrorism and made great sacrifices and important contributions in this war”. Adding that “China believes that the international community should fully recognize Pakistan’s efforts in combating terrorism”, according to her statements in the daily Chinese press release. 

The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswomanHua Chunyingtransferred the Chinese official vision by saying“We are pleased to see cooperation between Pakistan and the United States in the field of combating terrorism based on mutual respect, and that they work together for stability and security in the region and the world”, she added “China hopes that relevant US policies will help promote security, stability, and the development of Afghanistan and the region”. She was trying to formally convey China’s view to the United States, India and the international community regarding the Chinese support for the government of Pakistan in its war against terrorism, contrary to the vision of India and the United States⁽⁴⁾.

China seeksregional and global support for targeting Uighur Islamistsbut refrains from backing India’s efforts to weaken the terror groups like the “Jaish-e-Mohammed” (JeM) and “Lashkar-e-Taiba” (LeT), who are being accused by the American and Indian sides, as they are the Pakistani army’s ‘strategic assets’ to wage asymmetric war against India. Beijing has also blocked New Delhi’s proposals on several occasions at the UNSCto designate Hizbul Mujahedeenchiefs (Syed Salahuddin, Abdul RehmanMakki and Azam Cheema)of the Lashkar-e-Taiba as terrorists. This “selective characterization” poses several challenges for the success of counter-terrorism efforts in South Asia. India’s application to the Security Council(UNSC Sanctions Committee), also known as 1267 Committee, to designate JeM chief, Masood Azhar, as terrorist has been repeatedly rejected because of China’s veto against the Indian and American attempts ⁽⁵⁾.                                                                           

The Chinese official support for Pakistan in its war against terrorism comes as a result of the importance of the economic corridor and the Chinese port of Gwadar at Pakistanthat passes in Pakistan within the framework of the Chinese plan for the “Belt and Road”, with targeting Chinese projects in Pakistan and that region. Therefore, the Pakistani army decided to deploy a new contingent to protect the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or what is known as “Sepak”, and the Pakistanis assert that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a vivid example of the deep-rooted friendship between Pakistan and China, and they are fully determined ensuring the security of the project, and Pakistan believes that the success of the Chinese project will lead to the injection of more employment and business opportunities with more economic opportunities to come, the people’s lifestyle will improve and the hostile elements will gradually fail in Pakistan and Southeast Asia⁽⁶⁾.

Therefore, with the help of China, Pakistan strengthens all the security measures taken by the Pakistani army to protect the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, especially since this project was a target of extremist elements and the fundamentalist tide in the (Baluchistan) region in Pakistan. With the Pakistani government’s assurance that the “security situation in the “Baluchistan” region has improved since the launch of the Economic Corridor project, and now there is better infrastructure, as many Chinese projects were under implementation, and with each coming day, the security situation and development will improve, besides the Chinese investments at the Pakistani city and “port of Gwadar” within the framework of the “Belt and Road Chinese Initiative” has become stronger today, not as it was two years ago, and it will be in the future on par with the ports of developed countries” ⁽⁷⁾.

Hence, we find the Pakistani assertion that its war on terror is a task to protect its interests and those of its ally China, and that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor provided benefits to both China and Pakistan, questioning the double standards of some specific countries regarding investment and refuting the allegations of a” debt trap ⁽⁸⁾. 

Assad Omer, Chairman of the Standing Committee for Financial Affairs of the National Assembly in Pakistan”, said, “The false accusations that have been directed at China’s investments in Pakistan and the region aim to create bad feelings among people by defaming the motives of Chinese investment and making China’s interests a target for terrorists. The former Pakistani Minister of Finance Assad Omer also defended the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project”, as a “major project” within the framework of the “Belt and Road Initiative proposed by China”, in an interview with the “Chinese news agency” (Xinhua)” ⁽⁹⁾.                 

One of the major determinants of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s South Asia policy is to neutralize the perceived American strategy to contain China with the support of China’s regional allies’ like Pakistan in the face of American allies like India. The US and China share a complex and multi-layered set of ties that cuts across each other’s economic, political and security interests in both Pakistan and India ⁽¹⁰⁾.                                                                                                         

Research Significance

We will address the importance of studying the main terrorist militants, jihadists groups and extremist fundamentalists in India and Pakistan, and the other external pressures, as follow:                             

A) Theoretical Significance, our thesis will study the different debates and approaches on the extensions of the terrorist militants, and fundamentalists tide and networks in India and Pakistan, and their extensions abroad the Asian regions, focusing on the main terrorist attacks targeting the Indian interests, and the main challenges against the South Asia region.                                                                                      

B) Practical Significance, our study will explain some case studies experiences for the interventions and extensions of the extremist militants, terrorist jihadists groups and tide fundamentalism,focusing on the roles of thegreat and regional powers in combating terrorism and the main adopted polices to defend the Asian region, besides the reciprocal accusations and arguments betweenIndia and Pakistan in sponsoring and supporting terrorist and fundamentalist movements and militias and the US and Chinese roles and strategiesto support its allies.                                                                   

Research Problem

It is well known that terrorist jihadists and extremist fundamentalists, in South and Southeast Asia, and especially on the borders between India and Pakistan, have established a network of cooperation and extensions to Salafi groups active in the Middle East and the Asian continent, and on they were headed by Jaish Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Mujahedeen Groups in Pakistan, and its extensions into India and accusing it of launching many terrorist attacks against Indian targets and interests. 

The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that most of the jihadist groups operating in South and Southeast Asia have established strong links with ISIS, Al Qaeda, the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Middle East⁽¹¹⁾. 

The problem is that some of these fighters who belong to the countries of South and Southeast Asia, especially Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan, have established jihadist networks that have received funding, support and advice from Al- Qaeda and ISIS. They carried out many terrorist attacks against Indian interests such as Jammu and Kashmir Statewhich was targeted by a severe attack in February 2018, which resulted in Indian casualties. Hence, India made many accusations against Pakistan of sponsoring, supporting and harboring many Islamic militants to harm its interests. 

On the other hand, Pakistan supported by the Chinese side and its Belt and Road projects in Pakistan is rejected the Indian accusations supported by the US. Here, we will find the role of the external factor in supporting regional differences between India and Pakistan, with China standing and supporting Pakistan and the United States for its ally India. This exacerbated the problem in each party’s use of several strategies and tacticsto strike at the interests of the other party and harm it.  

 The paper seeks to answer the following questions: 

The researcher is mainly seeking beyond the tools for combating the terrorist jihadists, fundamentalism tide and extremist groups, in South and Southeast Asia, and especially on the borders between India and Pakistan, and the role of the foreign, external and regional powers, mainly USA and China in intervention to resolve this dilemma. To answer this question, we should study the map of the spread of the terrorist and fundamentalists and the American and Chinese roles in the Asian region. The study will basically answer the major interrelated main questionsabout:                                                                            

What are the main terrorist jihadists, fundamentalism tide and extremist groups, on the borders between India and Pakistan, and the role of the external factors China and the USA, besides the Indian Lobby to influence the American administration against them?

The study will also address the domination of the main terrorist jihadist groups, and the fundamentalism tidebetween India and Pakistan from different approaches and perspectives, analyzing the main challenges of combating terrorism in the Asian region and the roles of the great powers. Thesis will discuss foundational and cutting-edge research that addresses some “sub-questions”, such as:

1- What are the main terrorist jihadists and extremist fundamentalists, in South and Southeast Asia, and especially on the borders between India and Pakistan?                                                    2- What are the main roles of the Indian Lobbyin the United States of America onthe American electionsand Washington’s policies combating thefundamentalism terrorism tideandPakistani extremist movements?                                                                             3- What are the consequences and challenges of the Americanpolitical and security rapprochement with India and its implications on Chinese interests and theBelt and Road Initiative in the region? 

4- What are the differences of theAmerican and Indianscenarios to combat thefundamentalist tide and jihadist movementsand the Chinese and Pakistani plans and policies to defend their interests?  

Methodology

The study is based on a secondary analysis of the literature available through the reading and analysis of research studies that address the topic, putting in our consideration the diversity of more specialized publications are dealing with the impact The impact of the fundamentalist tide and terrorist movements in India on its relations with its neighbor Pakistan, and the role of external factorsChina and Washington in interfering with itsregional allies to impose its interests and agenda on all parties.. So, the most relevant approaches and methodologies to our study theoretical framework would be:  

1) Case Study – Methodology   

A case study is a research method common in social science. It is based on an in-depth investigation of a single individual, group, or event. Case studies may be descriptive or explanatory ⁽¹²⁾. 

The main proposed methodology provided the basis for our study is the “Case Study” of the Jihadist, fundamentalist forces, and the armed terrorist movements in the Pakistani and Indian regimes, and the role of their great power supports of the U.S. and China to intervene for maintaining dominantly their interests in many cases, additionally the ability of the Indian Lobbyto play a vital role to influence the American administration to be involved to control the Pakistani fundamentalism tide which is supported by China to protect its initiative for Belt and Road and its projects located at Pakistan⁽¹³⁾.  This case of interventions is a good test for our theory for three reasons, as follows:                                     

1) First, Jihadist terrorism – as a case study for causing internal chaos in countries, especially the case of Pakistan and India, and harming their interests in many cases, using overt or covert mechanisms bypenetration and targeting the economic and political interest – which is forming the deadliest threat facing the states and peoples of South Asia, including India and Pakistan. Most experts agree that the “Army of Muhammad armed terrorist group” or as Know “Jaish-e-Mohammed” (JeM) in Pakistan is the most threatening to the Indian interior, especially its responsibility for a number of terrorist operations in the state ofJammu and Kashmir in northern India, in addition to other movements that extend with Pakistan and the India, such as: Taliban movement, the group) The Sunni Islamist group allied with Al Qaeda, the Mujahedeen Group, Lashkar-e-Taiba) and others, which want to re-imposestrict Islamic rule in the Pakistani state, andspreading chaos and turmoil in India, Pakistan and the region, and strike China’s interests and projects within the framework of its Chinese Belt and Road initiativeand its mega projects In Pakistan⁽¹⁴⁾.                                                                                      

2) Second, A recent development that raises deep concern in Jammu and Kashmir is the rise in the popularity of ISIS and its ideology related to the caliphate, especially among the Kashmiri youth in India, Where indicators confirm that there are internal reasons related to the nature of the Indian political system itself, and its way of dealing with internal problems, especially the problems and demands of Muslims in the Indian Kashmir, which has a Muslim majority of its population.                        

3) Third, the starting point for understanding the most important developments of the issue is to study the role of the external and regional factors and pressures to deal with the fundamentalist and terrorist movements inside Pakistan and India, especially the US and Chinese roles. With the US strategy of practicing a policy of containment and security pressure on China in Pakistan, and terrorist groups targeting Chinese interests and projects in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Gwadar Port and its Chinese investments in Pakistan. Hence, we find that each of those external parties exert their influence on the interior of India and Pakistanto impose its interests in the region ⁽¹⁵⁾.  

The role of the external factor is also represented in the role of the Indian lobby in Washington in pressuring and influencing the passage of the Indian state’s agendaand persuading the US decision-maker to impose sanctions on Pakistan to curb the growth and increase of terrorist operations and attacks that target the Indian interior lands and harm its interests.                                                                                   

2) National Interest – Approach  

National Interest is a key concept in managing politics of the states, according to the context in which it is used. Statesmen and policy-makers have always used it in ways suitable to them and to their objective of justifying the actions of their states ⁽¹⁶⁾. 

Hitler justified expansionist policies in the name of “German national interests”. This approach saying that: “all the nations are always engaged in the process of fulfilling or securing the goals of their national interests”. The foreign policy of each nation is formulated on the basis of its national interest and it is always at work for securing its goals. It is a universally accepted right of each state to secure its national interests. 

A state always tries to justify its actions on the basis of its national interest. The behavior of a state is always conditioned and governed by its national interests ⁽¹⁷⁾. Hence, it is essential for us to know the meaning and content of “National Interest of the USA strategy and Chinese interests and benefits to intervene to Pakistani and Indian regimes” for combating tensions between India and Pakistan due to the increase in terrorist attacks, and India’s accusation of Pakistan’s incursion into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir to harm its national security.                                                                                                        

Our theoretical framework of the study is testing our arguments using “National Interest approach“. So, we can apply, as follows:  

A) We assess the national interest impact of the area of mutual threatsbetween the Pakistani and Indian countries, which is in fact terrifying threats to the entire world, especially Washington and Beijing, as each party seeks to protect its interests in the Asian region. The Indians, in turn, do not overlook such a scenario, and therefore they prepare their strategic cards to deal with various possibilities. Strategic benefits are accelerating between the three Asian poles, which are China, India and Pakistan, while Washington is trying to take advantage of the regional and global balance game to neutralize and restrict the Chinese role in Pakistan and South Asia with the help of its ally of India ⁽¹⁸⁾.                                                                                                           

B) We perform a case study of defending the national interests by the U.S. and China as “hegemonic actors” intervene in Pakistani and Indian regimes in many cases since we have seen with the Donald Trumpadministration. And the attempt of the US administration in 2018 suspending and withholding military aid to Pakistan in support of its ally India, and Washington’s support for New Delhi in accusing Pakistan of causing many terrorist attacks inside Indian territory.

C) On the other hand the Chinese response represented by the use of the right of veto in the Security Council in support of for Pakistan against the Indian and American requests and proposals against Pakistan, and the Chinese refusal t to include some terrorist groups that India requested to be listed as terrorists supported by the United States of America, and thus we find that each side defends its interests differently from the other side ⁽¹⁹⁾.                                                               

D) Both the United States of American and the Indian Lobby at Washingtonare supporting India to control and restrict the Chinese emergence and role in South Asia and Pakistan and to harm the Chinese Initiative for Silk and Road there are many intense and deep accusations from the American side against Pakistan that it is not fighting terrorism enough, which is rejected by Pakistan, which could push them to alliance with the Chinese interests game and the matter is further complicated by American support for India to defend as well its interests against China⁽²⁰⁾.                                                                

Finally, we recapitulate our findings and explore their relevance for current US and Chinese foreign policy debates of intervention to combat the Fundamentalism tide and the terrorist groups in the Asian region.                                                       

Study Division

Whereas the researcher is seeking through the study of the impact of the increase in terrorist attacks and activities on the US and Chinese foreign interference with its allies India and Pakistan, and its general and comprehensive impact on stability in South Asia and the surrounding region, so the researcher will identify and study the following aspects, which are themes relevant to the concerns of the researcher, it entails addressing the following:                                                                                                

First: Role of the Indian Lobby to influence on theAmerican electionsand Washington’s policies 

Second: The ability of the Indian Lobby to influence on the USA towards political and security rapprochement with India in the field ofcombating the fundamentalism terrorism tideand Pakistani extremist movements

Third: Different facets of terrorism and fundamentalism in India, South and Southeast Asia, and Pakistan:Map of the spread of (terrorist groups) 

Fourth: Reciprocal accusations and arguments betweenIndia and Pakistanin(sponsoring and supporting terrorist and fundamentalist movements and militias and the US and Chinese rolesbetween them

Fifth: Theimpact ofChinese Belt and Road strategyto build the “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor” (CPEC) and the Chinese “Gwadar Port” in Pakistan to control the area ofmarine lineson the American influence and Indian policies against the Pakistani fundamentalist movements tide

Sixth: A comparison betweenAmerican and Indianscenarios to combat thefundamentalist tide and jihadist movementsand theChinese and Pakistani plans and policiesto defend their interests

1. Seventh: The conclude remarks and proposed recommendations

The role of the (Indian lobby) in political influence in the American administration, the presidential elections and the American decision-making centers to obtain American support with India to “fight fundamentalism and terrorism against Pakistan and limiting the Chinese influence in the face of India”

Indian Lobbying, means: Exercising pressures on the American administration, it is as well an impressive term used to describe “Indian groups or organizations” whose members try to influence the American decision-making in a particular body or entity, and in the United States there are more than one lobby, the most famous lobbying of which is the “Indian Lobby”, in addition to, of course, the Jewish lobby that exerts pressure on the American administration, the American legislative authorities “Senate and the Representatives” to support India’s policies against Pakistan and China on the issue of combating terrorism and fundamentalism in South and Southeast Asia. 

Recently, studies focused on thecommunity coming from India, which is known as the Indian Lobby in the United States of America, especially, after it became a large number of the population, and it became clear that it is one of the most effective, influential and wealthy communities ⁽²¹⁾ . Despite the close personal relationship between US PresidentDonald Trumpand Indian Prime MinisterNarendra Modi,New Delhi maintains balanced preferences towards the American presidential race, as the efforts of Democratic candidateJoe Bidento attract the votes of theIndian community in the United States,and his assertion of“supporting India in the border clash with China”,and the legacy of cooperation relations between the former American administration underBarak Obamaand New Delhi, increased the reassurance of Indian political circles regarding the results of the presidential race⁽²²⁾ .

On the other hand, the Indian rapprochement with the“Trump administration”through theinfluence of the Indian lobby at the USAat the geostrategic level did not prevent the existence of fundamental differences between the two parties on issues offighting fundamentalism tide and terrorism militants against Pakistan and China, trade, immigration, Indo-Iranian relations, especially those related to oil imports,in addition to New Delhi’s endeavor to maintainopen channels with Moscow regarding arms imports without exposure to US sanctions ⁽²³⁾. We can clarify the extent of the (Indian Lobby) influences on US decision-making and within the US administration itself, through the following mechanisms and sections:

1.1 The role of the “Indian lobby in Washington” in managing the complex relations between the US administration and the government of India: focusing on the term of President “Trump” and Prime Minister of India “Narendera Modi”

1. It turns out that the Indian category in Americahas become a large number of the population, and it is also one of the most effective and influential groups of American society. In a report published in the“American Foreign Affairs magazine” about thesuccess of the Indian lobby in the political and economic spheres in Washington,it proves the importance of therapprochement between the Indian government and the “Indian lobby” to pass and pressure on Washington in favor of India, especially in cooperation in the field of combating terrorism and fundamentalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan with Washington’s help, especially during Trump’s periodand his successorJoe Biden” ⁽²⁴⁾ . Here, we can trace the President’s Trump relations with India during his tenure and the role of the Indian Lobby in his visit to India on February 2020, through understanding the following:
   
2. The mutual hospitality of President Trump and Prime Minister Modi during the exchange of visits was nothing but an expression of that personal closeness, and the mutual awareness of the place of image policies in strengthening relations, which was also evident in the huge celebrations and mass crowds that were organized during these visits which seemed exceptional at the level of organization, letters and pledges to strengthen relations.
   
3. At the strategic level, relations between India and the United States have not been closer than the current stage, as the Trump administrationstands firmly in itssupport for India in the border clash with China in the Ladakh region, and pledged to export quality weapons to New Delhi after the amendment of the rules restricting the sale of advanced drones. For foreign partners especially MQ-1 Predator, India is looking to acquire combat helicopters, multi-role fighters, transport aircraft and advanced artillery from the United States. This parallels with the succession of advanced naval maneuvers between theQuartet countries of the in the Indian Ocean led by Washington ⁽²⁵⁾.
   
4. Indian analysts describe relations with Washington during President Trump’s term as extremely complex, governed by intricate contradictions to say the least. In this regard, the leaderships of the two countries are partially similar in their affiliation with the currents of the populist right, and their belief in the “strong man” model in managing domestic and foreign policies, as well as the congruence of Indian and American interests in limiting Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean and South Asia, and their adoption of the “Hindu-Pacific” concept in the regional policy that is based on the close geographical link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, in addition to membership in the “quadripartite security dialogue” in Asia, which also includes Japan and Australia, as well as New Delhi and Washington, and aims to contain Chinese influence in Asia⁽²⁶⁾.

• And the visit of the US President Trumpto India on February 2020, and his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as a result of pressure from the Indian Lobby in Washington, to strengthen the strategic partnership with India, given the influence of the Indian Lobby in the US elections in November 2020. There is a relationship between President Trump’s visit to India in February 2020 and the strong Indian lobby pressure in Washington comes through an understanding of the strong influence of the Indian Lobby in the United States, as follows:

• Trump’s visit becomes more important in light of the important the increasing importance of the Indian lobby’s role in the United States, and its success in accessing American political and economic centers. In addition to what is characteristic of a component Americans of Indian origin have important qualitative features compared to other Asian Americans, because they are the most educated, and the highest income in the United States, which made the Indian lobby one of the powerful American lobbies ⁽²⁷⁾.

• Americans of Indian origin have succeeded in gaining access to important American institutionsin recent years, on top of which membership in both houses of Congress. In addition to that, the strong relationship between the Indian lobby and its Jewish counterpart in the United States, and the role that each plays in strengthening US relations With Israel and India, strengthening Israeli-Indian relations.

• In other words, strengthening the strategic partnership between the United States and India at this time for Trump’s visit to India on February 2020, will in turn be strengthened the Indian lobby’s activity during the US election period, on the political and economic levels. The importance of this dimension increases in light of (some studies conducted on Americans of Indian descent), which indicated that the largest proportion of these people about 65% tend to vote for the Democratic Party competing with President Trump and his Republican Party ⁽²⁸⁾.

• In the same context, another important American motive behind Trump’s recent visit on February 2020 to India, is to work on strengthening economic and trade relations between the two countries, under the influence of two main factors. The first of them relates to the new Corona virus crisis and its possible repercussions on the volume of Chinese demand for American goods, which means the difficulty of implementing the US trade agreement, signed in mid-January. The second factor relates to the positive estimates of the Indian economy, which paves the way for an American bet on strengthening the volume of Indian demand to compensate for the expected decline of its Chinese counterpart, at least during 2020.

• Trump’s visit to India also gains additional importance in view of the accelerating developments in the Afghan file, starting with direct talks between the United States and the Taliban that ended with the signing of the agreement to reduce the level of violence that took effect on February 22, 2021, and then the peace agreement to be signed on February 29, 2021. 

The success of the peace process in Afghanistan after Trump’s visit to India requires a number of conditions, the most important of which are: obtaining the support of the regional neighboring countries, especially India. Most importantly, however, strengthening US-Indian coordination on Afghanistan at this stage is a necessary condition for balancing – or limiting – the Pakistani role, a role of which the American perception remains negative despite the support that Pakistan provided to the US dialogue with the Taliban during 2018-2019⁽²⁹⁾.

Based on the previous analysis, the Egyptian researcher concluded that the US President Trump’s unprecedented visit to India was affected by the influence of the Indian lobby in Washington, especially before the American presidential elections on November 2020 and the attempt to attract the voices of the powerful Indian lobby in Washington, as it comes within the framework of managing a group of transformations and strategic interests in the regions of Central and South Asia. So, the aggregate of these data is what makes the visit important. 

But, in the personal opinion of the researcher, I think that it is likely that the visit of Trump to India will not change the Indian attitudes towards the main actors and other strategic partners, and it is difficult to speculate that it will play an influential role in changing India’s role in the current international match. Although Trump’s visit and the talks that follow between the American and Indian administrations may lead to expanding India’s regional role and strengthening its position in the policies of containing China, and making more room for New Delhi to play an advanced role in the Afghan arena and balancing the Pakistani role there, but, in all cases, this is still subject to a future analysis, especially under the change of the American administration of Trump and the arrival of a new administration led by Joe Biden.

1.2 Influences of the Indian lobby in Washington to support the United States’ policies in favor of India

1. The relations between the United States and India during the term of President Trump were not without clear disparities and interest disagreements, which India sought to put under control and prevent it from coming out into the open, which is related to the clash in the priorities of national policies pursued in the two countries, and the conflict between the slogans “America First” raised by Trump, and “India first”, which is adopted by Modi ⁽³⁰⁾. The most prominent of these contentious issues were as follows:
   
2. Immigration restriction policies: India is one of the most prominent countries affected by the policies of restricting immigration and granting work visas followed by the Trumpadministration, especially for specialists in the technology sector, as a large part of immigrants to Washington fall under the category of skilled workers, a group that has been threatened a succession of stopping entry visas to the United States and restricting their stay periods, which is related to sectors such as technology, medicine, engineering and other advanced sectors, in addition to the restrictions that may be imposed on study and educational missions to the United States.
   
3. The American trade war: Washington’s targeting of China by the trade war did not prevent India from being harmed by these measures, as the Indian steel industry suffered huge losses due to US anti-subsidy fees, which prompted New Delhi to sue Washington in the “World Trade Organization”, and it also responded by raising tariffs on Many American products. New Delhi fears of “Trump’s expansion in imposing dumping duties and protectionist policies”, which seriously threatens Indian exports to the United States, in addition to the indirect negative repercussions of the raging war between the United States and China ⁽³¹⁾.
   
4. Pressure on energy security: The tightening of sanctions on Tehran, and the Trump administration’s adoption of a policy of zero exports of Iranian oil, puts pressure on India, which is one of the largest importers of oil from Tehran. Washington’s reluctance to renew India’s import exemptions has led to its search for alternative sources to import oil from the Arab Gulf states and African countries. American pressure also caused a review of close economic relations with Iran, which includes massive movement of foreign trade and investments due to the increasing US sanctions against it, which affects the “India First” policy pursued by the Modi government in maximizing economic interests.
   
5. Restricting the diversification of arms sources: The Law of “Combating the Enemies of the United States Through Sanctions” known by the acronym “Katsa” is considered one of the issues that cause muffled disagreements in US-Indian relations, as India has contracted during the last period on several Russian arms systems, including The “S-400 air defense system and specific weapons systems in the maritime domain, in addition to efforts to obtain “Russian MiG-29 and “Su-30 fighters, which may cause them to fall under US sanctions. The Trump administration more than once hinted at the sanctions in response to the S-400 deal, including the US President’s comment on the deal in October 2018, saying: “India will see the American response sooner than you think”, which prompted the Indian military leaders to affirm the independence of the Indian decision regarding armaments, an issue that was overlooked at a later stage without implying the end of US pressure regarding Indian arms resources ⁽³²⁾.

Disputes over Afghanistan: The US military withdrawal from Afghanistan raises concerns in New Delhi about the effects of the spread of terrorist threats across South Asia), as Indian think tanks reserve reservations about the US plan to withdraw from Afghanistan, while President Trump’s administration criticizes from time to time the limited participation of neighboring countries and Including India in security arrangements to ensure stability in Afghanistan, contentment with symbolic and economic support, and burden the United States to confront terrorism without participating in it ⁽³³⁾.

So, according to our mentioned analysis, the Egyptian researcher concluded that it has become evident that the Indian Prime MinisterNarendra Modiwon power for the second time in a row in May 2019, has strengthened his directions that he took in the first period, towards apartnership with the United States of America with the help of the influence of the Indian lobby in Washington to confront the Chinese rise and its support for Pakistan, which is a reflection of the desire of the Indian Prime MinisterModiand the ideology adopted by hisBharatiya Janata Partyto make India as thedominant power in South Asia, and to elevate it to the ranks of great powers, and he will devote his foreign policy in the coming period to achieving this goal with the influence of theIndian Lobbyin Washington and his influence on the current US PresidentJoe Biden, especially since his deputy,Camilla Harris, is coming from an Indian origin roots in the first place.

1.3 The role of the Indian lobby in the US presidential race between Trump and the winning president Joe Biden in November 2020 to support American political decision-making in favor of limiting Chinese influence in the face of India and confronting common terrorist threats between New Delhi and Washington

1. Despite the geographical divide between India and Washington, New Delhi has been no more present in the US presidential race than the 2020 elections, whether in the aide nominations, the election campaigns, or the pivotal issues that New Delhi places first⁽³⁴⁾. In this regard, the most prominent features of this presence were as follows:
   
2. The targeting of American Indians: The American electoral campaigns focused on attracting the votes of American Indians as a demographic bloc with an increasing influence, and a report published by the Foreign Policy Magazine indicated that the community that constitutes only 1% of the American elective force is considered the second bloc among immigrants after the Americans of Mexican origins, their numbers are increasing rapidly by more than 150% between 2000 and 2018, in addition to being the ethnic group with the highest income, exceeding $ 100,000 per person on average in 2015, which made its members increasingly among the groups that donate to electoral campaigns. The targeting operations included extensive advertisements in Hindi and local languages ​​in areas of concentrated communities, in addition to broadcasting advertisements on television networks targeting South Asian communities, as well as focusing on Indian issues in the discourse of election campaigns and organizing virtual events for Indian celebrities to motivate young people to vote. Because Indian communities are concentrated in swing states, such as Pennsylvania, Texas and Michigan, where every vote makes a strong difference in the presidential race track ⁽³⁵⁾.

The employment of identity politics: The election campaigns focus on identity politics in winning the support of American Indians. In addition to the vice presidential candidate Kamala Harris, whose mother belongs to the Indian community, Biden’s campaign has sought help from a number of Indian aides and advisors, at their forefront Dr.Vivek Merthy, a specialist in surgery, whose association with Biden dates back to his tenure as Vice President Barack Obama. He contributed to drafting Biden’s plan to confront Corona, and the Indian economist, Raj Shetty of Harvard University, who worked with Biden’s team in drafting his economic program. 

1. 3) On the other hand, the US President’s campaign launched the “American Indian Coalition” in the government and the private sector led by the president’s son, Junior Donald Trump Jr., under the name “Indian Voices for Trump” to support the strong strategic partnership between the United States and India, which parallels Trump’s display of the strength of his friendship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in an attempt to polarize American Indians away from their traditional party affiliations supporting the Democratic Party, as 72% of American Indians support Trump’s rival, Joe Biden.

1. Indian observers motivate against Trump: President Trump statements during the last presidential debate in October 2020 sparked increased anger in India after describing the air in India as dirty, which prompted many citizens to call on the Indian Prime Minister to take these statements into account. Trumpmentioned poor air quality in India in justifying withdrawal from the Paris climate change agreement, stressing that he had saved trillions of dollars by his decision not to join due to not treating the United States fairly. India’s social media has topped “hash tags” condemning Trump statements such as Howdy Modi to denounce Trump and confirm their insult⁽³⁶⁾.

1. Pledges to curb Chinese influence: The candidates’ election campaigns were not without pledges to support India in its clash with China, which reached the point of border clashes in the Ladakh border region, where the US Secretary of State pledged to strongly support India and engage in the confrontation. Biden expressed his readiness to support India in curbing “Chinese expansion”, as part of the policy of closer relations with allies, and building confidence that was cracked during the term of Trump. Biden has also stressed that Beijing will not get away with it if it threatens its neighbors in Asia.

1. Confronting common threats: President Biden pledged to work with Washington’s allies in Asia, with India at the top, in the face of common threats, especially those related to combating terrorism, as he confirmed that he would adopt a policy of zero tolerance for supporting terrorism in South Asia, in an implicit reference to New Delhi’s accusations against Pakistan. Biden also appears less enthusiastic than Trump regarding the complete withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, which is one of the main points of contention between the Trump administration and India ⁽³⁷⁾.

1. The influence and influence of the Indian Lobby in Washington increased after the US President Trump assumed the presidency, as the Indian Lobby succeeded in inducing Washington to replace Pakistan with India as its main ally in South Asia, and the United States supported the government of India in an attempt to nullify Chinese influence in Pakistan and South Asia. In 2018, the White House suspended $ 2 billion in military aid to Pakistan, while at the same time supporting India with economic and military partnerships. At a time when India has become a partner with Washington, Pakistan finds itself paired with its ally China. To disrupt the economic corridor, United States of America continues to create and support discord in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, which is at the center of the China-Pakistan economic corridor. 

Many Chinese and Pakistani analysts, politicians, and military officers agreed that the influence of the Indian lobby in Washington is mainly aimed at stopping Chinese influence in South Asia, as the US-Indian relationship is striving to undermine the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and the Chinese Economic Corridor. Hence, terrorist groups are active in the Baluchistan region in Pakistan, which mainly aims to strike Chinese projects, with Chinese and Pakistani accusations of spreading India’s activity and financing terrorist groups stationed in Baluchistan, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army(BLA), to sabotage Pakistan and the Chinese corridor project, in cooperation between the US CIA, and the Indian Research and Analysis Wing Indian Intelligence (RAW), take part jointly in the Balochistan project to strike at China’s interests and projects in Pakistan⁽³⁸⁾.

In conclusion, despite Biden’s assurances of his intention to rapprochement with India, there are clear points of discrepancy between Biden and Prime Minister Modi with regard to the latter’s national policies, and the BJP’s handling of religious minorities issues, in addition to concerns about Biden’s direction of rapprochement with China after a comprehensive deal between the two countries, which later affects the balances in South Asia. On the other hand, the differences with the Trump administration over issues of immigration, trade, energy security and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, all of these indications further limit the Indian preferences in the US presidential race, so that they await the outcome of the elections while preparing to deal with the new reality.

2. Different facets of terrorism and fundamentalism tide in India, South and Southeast Asia, and Pakistan: Map of the spread of (terrorist groups) 

Fundamentalism Tide means a strict adherence to or interpretation of a doctrine, set of principles, etc., as of a social, legal, political, or religious group or system ⁽³⁹⁾ . Both New Delhi and Islam Abad ban dozens of armed groups, and fundamentalists’terrorist militants. Generally, the Indian subcontinent is one of the most turbulent regions in Southeast Asia. As it witnesses a wide and complex spread of violent and terrorist activities that feed on its multiple Ethnic and religious tendencies and components, as well as ideological conflicts based on economic and social grievances, as this activity is known with its support from other regional powers, and India in turn is experiencing violent activity that traces its roots back to the period after India’s independence from Britain in 1947. The atmosphere of great unrest in post-independence India led to wars between New Delhi and some of its neighbors. Where there have been three major wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and East Pakistan “Bangladesh”, while India entered into a military war with China in 1962, a war that fought over the borders between the two countries ⁽⁴⁰⁾. 

During the period, from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, India witnessed limited activity by local armed groups, which are groups that are motivated by different Religious or left-wing ideologies, and it seeks to establish separate states from India, but with the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, New Delhi witnessed an unusual growth in the number of armed organizations that spread throughout India, which resulted in the escalation of sectarian violence in the country in the eighties, and the outbreak of widespread riots . India succeeded in controlling the riots and terrorist operations began to decline since the mid-nineties, until the “Bombay attacks” in 2008 were the most prominent in the country’s history during the past two decades, a clear message for the continuation of violence in the country, despite the authorities’ success in calming the situation, terrorist operations in the country are still frequent and exacerbation, as the number of armed organizations increases as a result of the multiple defections within each organization ⁽⁴¹⁾ 

This research paper seeks to identify the multiple facets of terrorism: the map of the spread of terrorist groups in India and Pakistan, to read the history of banned groups in India, according to the Indian government’s lists of up to 40 organizations, while addressing the most prominent references of those organizations, their motives, the reasons for their emergence and their spread, while tracing Map of their spread and their connections; Domestic and overseas. Then we analyze the role of the United States in the (security alliance with India to combat religious fundamentalism, terrorist movements and extremism), while discussing the impact of this on the “Chinese position and China’s interests” through its (Belt and Road) initiative and China’s huge project in the Pakistani (Gwadar Port), and China’s position on these movements Fundamentalism, especially in Pakistan, and even research and analysis of the position of America and India on the Chinese presence in the region⁽⁴²⁾. Here, the Egyptian researcher will divide the Map of the spread of terrorist groups in both India and Pakistan, and their negative impacts on the South and South East Asia to the following.

2.1 Banned Terrorism Fundamentalism armed groups in Pakistan

Islamabad launched a campaign against banned groups and arrested dozens. As, there are 67 banned groups in Pakistan, some are armed and some charitable, which are being accused of involvement in financing terrorism. In 2002, Islamabad classified the “Army of Islam” a terrorist group and banned it in the country. In the wake of the escalation of tension between India and Pakistan in March 2019, Pakistan is working to tighten the screws on a number of banned armed groups, which are involved interrorist acts in the border region with New Delhi ⁽⁴³⁾. 

1. Here we can observe the most important centers of proliferation and groupings of fundamentalist and terrorist groups in Pakistan, and their most important leaders and goals, as follows:

Lashkar-e-Taiba… the other side of the terrorist group that exercises its duties in Pakistan under the pretext of “charitable work”: it is one of the most dangerous terrorist groups targeting the (Kashmir region administered by India), as this terrorist group and its fighters are active in the northern part of Kashmir. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, known as: (LeT Group) was established in 1990 from a former engineering professor at the University of Punjab in Pakistan Hafiz Muhammad Saied, and was one of the most prominent armed groups operating in Pakistani territory, and it was alleged to send fighters across the Line of Control to the Indian-administered Kashmir region. According to Indian security forces’ data, the group has the largest presence of fighters in India-administered Kashmir, with 129 active fighters. 

1. The danger of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan is that it carried out aseries of attacks against Indian security forces when the Kashmiri armed movement began to escalate in the early 1990s, and in 2008, India blamed the Taiba group for the “Mumbai attacks” that It took place on December 7, 2008, which targeted195 killing people and wounding 327 Indians, when gunmen stormed hotels and a railway station, and India and the United States openly accused Hafiz Muhammad Saiedfounder of (Lashkar-e-Taiba) in Pakistan of being the mastermind of the attack against Indian targets. This prompted the “United States to set a reward of $ 10 million for his arrest”, along with his groupalso listed as armed terrorist groups banned by the United Nations. After 9 years of violent attacks, the Pakistani authorities released the cleric (Hafiz Saied), although they say that they have taken steps to control (Lashkar-e-Taiba), but the charitable wings of the group – The Da’awa Group and the Falah Humanitarian Foundation – accuse it of continuing to work freely in all Hafez Saied denies the existence of any link between the Dawa group he heads and the banned “Lashkar Taiba” group, even though he is the head of the Da’awa group, and Hafez Abdul Raouf who is the head of the Falah Humanitarian Foundation, he is also a man is wanted because of his alleged work with the Lashkar-e-Taiba group⁽⁴⁴⁾. 

“Da’awa group” / Jamaat Al-Da’awa: The group is led by “Hafiz Muhammad Saied”, a former lecturer at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore, Pakistan, and one of the most wanted persons in India. This group is classified as the latest version of the Lashkar-e-Taiba group as we have previously mentioned, which has participated in several attacks on the Indian army in Jammu and Kashmir. 

While the founder of the movement, Hafez Saied, says that theDawa group cares about the Islamic welfare, Washington believes that the Da’awa group is nothing but a front for the Lashkar organization. Therefore, Pakistan re-imposed the ban on the two Islamic societies linked to Hafez Saied following the attack against the Indian army forces on February 14, 2019, and confiscated the assets and funds of the terrorist preacher wanted by Washington, whose house arrest was lifted in 2018⁽⁴⁵⁾. 

1. Notifying that Hafiz Saied has been under house arrest since January 2016, claiming that The instructions of arresting Hafiz Saied came on from US former President Trump. More recently, “Da’awa Group” participated in the general elections in Pakistan in 2018 under the banner of the “Melli Islamic League” and the Mamalis Muslim League, but it was unable to get any seats, as the group tried to enter the political arena and launch a political party called the “Islamic Millie League” (MML). The party was not allowed to register in the 2018 elections, but its candidates ran as independents across the country, but did not win any seats ⁽⁴⁶⁾.

The “Army of Muhammad group” / Jaish Muhammad / (Muhammad Military) “JeM”: Founded by “Maulana Masoud Al-Azhar” in the late 1990s, He is as well a former member of the “Mujahedeen Movement” and is “classified as a “terrorist” from the United States, with international demands to place him on the terrorist list of the United Nations Security Council”, as they are believing that “Azhar” has links with “Al-Qaeda” and his group is involved in sending fighters to Afghanistan to fight US-led coalition forces. Additionally, this group has been also accused of working against Indian forces in the disputed Himalayan Valley. The group belongs to the Deobandi School the largest Arab religious institute for Hanaf in India. In 2000, the Army of Muhammad JeM claimed responsibility for most of the high-profile attacks in Kashmir and on targets elsewhere in India. More recently, the Pakistan-based group that runs anetwork of religious institutes there has also been the focus of Indian claims that its neighbor is sponsoring attacks on Indian soil, although India placed the founder of this militant “Maulana Masoud Al-Azhar” on its terrorist list, but today it has not been able to include his name on the international lists⁽⁴⁷⁾. 

The “Army of Muhammad group” has been involved in several high-profile suicide attacks and other attacks against Indian targets since its formation, including the 2001 attack on the “Indian Parliament in New Delhi and on the Legislative Assembly in India-administered Kashmir”, as its name was linked to the 2016 “Uri attack”, which killed at least (23 people are at a camp for Indian security forces in Indian-administered Kashmir), and the “Pathankot attack on the Indian air base”earlier of 2016, killing at least 8 people in a raid on the Indian Air Force) ⁽⁴⁸⁾.

1. On 14 February 2019, the “Army of Muhammad group” claimed responsibility for the “Pulwama attack”, as an Indian Military Police bus carrying security personnel on the “Jammu Srinaker highway” was attacked by a suicide bomber driving a car. This was the spark of the last military clash between the two neighboring countries, India and Pakistan, which have been fighting over sovereignty over the divided Kashmir region between them since 1947, and after this attack, the Pakistani government announced that “it had captured a huge compound of Muhammad’s army in the city of Bahawalpur in the center of the country. Days later, the Pakistani foreign minister said that The head of the armed group, Masoud Al-Azhar, was locating in the Pakistani lands not existing at all at India as some parts are claiming, but he did not provide further details⁽⁴⁹⁾.

1. Mobilizing the Pakistan Taliban: Founded in 2017 by “Baitullah Mehsud”, it is a conglomerate of several militant groups working against the Pakistani security forces, and the group is currently led by “Mullah Fadlallah”, who is reported to be residing in Afghanistan. The Pakistani army launched a large-scale offensive against the group, disbanding its forces in its stronghold in North Waziristan tribal region ⁽⁵⁰⁾.

1. Baluchistan Liberation Army: A secular militant Baloch group that has long been fighting for autonomy in the southwestern province of Baluchistan, which the group believes was forcibly integrated into Pakistan in 1947. And Pakistan accuses India of sponsoring this group, which New Delhi denies ⁽⁵¹⁾. 

• The other banned groups in Pakistan, include⁽⁵²⁾:

• The “Sibah Companions” of Pakistan (known collectively as the Sunnis and the Jamaa)
• The movements of Jafari Pakistan
• The Baluchi Republican Army

Al-Qaeda and ISIS

• Hizb Al-Tahrir
• The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
• The Work Committee for Shiite Students
• The Jund Allah Group, and 
• Al-Rahma Charitable Society Organization

The Association of Dangers

The Free and the Al-Ansar Groups

1. Based on the previous classification of the map of the most important fundamentalist and terrorist groups in Pakistan, and the overlap between them and India, through a number of these terrorist militias in Pakistan carrying out many terrorist operations against New Delhi, targeting their interests, we can note the following recent developments:

1. In the most recent developments, in March 2019, the Pakistani security forces launched a massive security campaign against a number of banned groups, within the framework of the (Pakistani National Action Plan to Combat Terrorism), with the aim of eradicating militancy from the country ⁽⁵³⁾.

1. As a result, Pakistani forces arrested dozens of those belonging to those groups, including the brother and son of the leader of the “Army of Islam” group, “Maulana Masoud Azhar”, whom New Delhi accuses of being involved in the terrorist attack, which targeted in February 2019 the (Indian security camp in Pulwama district). The attack, which took place in the Indian-controlled region of the disputed Kashmir region with Pakistan, resulted in the killing of more than 40 Indian soldiers, and wounding 20 others. 

1. Accordingly,Islamabad has frozen the assets of dozens of members of banned groups, and individuals who were listed on the United Nations Security Council sanctions lists. 

1. In February 2019, the Pakistani government took control of a religious school in the city of Bahawalpur, in the northeast of the country, and it was reported to be used as a headquarters for the organization of the Army of Islam.

1. In the beginning of February 2019, Islamabad also banned the Falah Humanitarian Foundation, a charitable organization established by the “Jamaat Al-Da’awa”.

1. India accused the “Pakistan Da’awa Group” of being behind the terrorist attack which killed 150 Indians in Mumbaiin 2009. 

In June 2018, the “Financial Action Task Force”, it’s a quasi-governmental organization based in Paris placed Pakistan on the list of countries believed to finance terrorism ⁽⁵⁴⁾.

2.2 The most prominent armed terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan and its impact and concentrations in India

1. India has banned dozens of armed groups, including Islamic, Hindus and Sikh groups. Both New Delhi and Islamabad share a single view of a number of armed groups, such as: the “Army of Islam, Al Qaeda and ISIS”, which are banned in both countries, but the change here, is that they differ in their perceptions of other groups. For example, New Delhi classifies the “Mujahedeen Party” as a terrorist group, while Islamabad considers it as a “fighting group for independence from Indian rule” in the Himalayan Valley region of Kashmir disputed with Pakistan. According to the Pakistani Ministry of Interior, there are 67 banned groups in the country, some of which are already armed groups, while others are classified as “charitable organizations” that are involved in financing terrorist groups ⁽⁵⁵⁾. Here we can observe the most important gathering centers of fundamentalist and terrorist groups in India, and the extent of their overlap with the armed Pakistani militias, and their most important leaders and goals, through the following:

1. The Islamic Students Movement in India: It was established in the state of Uttar Pradesh, northern India, on April 25, 1977, by “Muhammad Ahmadullah Siddiqui” who was working as a professor of journalism and public relations at Western Illinois University. The movement was banned in 2001 under the “Anti-Terrorism Act” (BOTA) on charges of committing anti-state activities. In 2008, the ban was briefly lifted by a special court, but it was later reimposed. In January of this year, the Indian government banned the movement for five years under the “Illegal Prevention Act”, and the Indian officials said that the movement engages in acts harmful to the security of the country” ⁽⁵⁶⁾.

1. The Mujahedeen Party: It is the largest indigenous rebel group in Jammu and Kashmir, and was established in 1989 by “Muhammad Ahsan Dar”, a former militant leader. The party, which is more inclined towards the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan, affirms that it will accept whatever decision the people make when they are given the option to choose the right to self-determination. In the past, the Mujahedeen Party has carried out hundreds of attacks against Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. The party is currently headed by the Kashmiri citizen “Syed Muhammad Yusuf Shah”, popularly known as “Syed Salahuddin”, who is currently residing in “Muzaffarabad in Azad Jammu and Kashmir” in the Pakistan-controlled part of the region ⁽⁵⁷⁾. 

1. Babar Khalsa International Organization: The organization is the oldest and most prominent Sikh organization in India. Babar Khalsa International calls for the formation of an “independent Sikh state called Khalistan”. Both “Talwinder Singh Parmar and Sukhdev Singh Babar” are the founding members of this organization. The organization was responsible for several attacks in India, and therefore, in 2018, the “United States placed the organization on the list of separatist movements that pose a threat to US interests abroad” ⁽⁵⁸⁾. 

1. The Garo National Liberation Army: The National Liberation Army was formed in 2009 by an Indian police officer named “Pakshara Sangma”, in order to achieve sovereignty for the “Garuland region” in the western regions of “Meghalaya State”, northeastern India. The “Garo National Liberation Army” participated in several cases of killing and kidnapping in the three “Garo Hills” districts of the state, and accordingly it was designated a terrorist organization by the Indian government. In February 2018, “Suhan Shira”, who was leading the “Garu army”, was shot dead. This represented a heavy blow to the group. 

• According to the Indian National Investigation Agency, other banned terrorist organizations, include⁽⁵⁹⁾:

Lashkar-e-Taiba

• Muhammad’s Army

Al-Qaeda

• The Indian Communist Army the (Maist)
• The Indian Mujahedeen Movement

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland

the Mujahedeen Movement, and ISIS 

Thus, as a result of continuing terrorist operations; India includes about 40 armed groups on the lists of banned organizations in the country, as a result of their participation in acts of violence. They are historical or new groups of multiple religious, ethnic, ideological, and left-wing references, some of which are based in India, and some are regional residing in some other cross-border neighboring countries. 

3. The impact of Chinese Silk and Road strategy to build Economic Corridor “CPEC” and Gwadar Port in Pakistan to control the area of marine lines on the American influence and Indian policies against the Pakistani fundamentalist movements tide 

China carried out the construction both of Gwadar Port and Economic Corridor (CPEC) in an exceptionally sensitive Pakistani site, in order to make the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative,and for China to also gain a foothold in the field of controllingmaritime linesin South and Southeast Asia, and also to be able to subject India to control. Thus, China, with Pakistani support, succeeded in neutralizing Indiaby land and sea. In addition, China has assisted theState of Pakistanand turned it into anuclear-armed countryto stand against India and protect its interests in the region in the face ofAmerican influence. In addition, China’s move to build ports and lay oil pipelines, and to build roads inMyanmaras well, is no less important. Above all, the port of Hambentola, which was built with Chinese aid in Sri Lanka,which is practically a cut-off part of the Indian continental bloc, is not a carefully thought-out implementation of the “pearl chain strategy” for (China’s strategy to encircle India) across the Indian Ocean, againstthe American penetrationin the region⁽⁶⁰⁾ .

The Egyptian researcher will divide this section into (three parts),explaining and analyzing the paths of relations between “New Delhi and Washington” on the one hand, and “Beijing’s relations with Islamabad” on the other hand, and in particular, analyze the mutual accusations between all regional and international parties withsponsorship and support the fundamentalist tide in the region of Kashmir and South Asia, and on the Indian-Pakistani borders,and Pakistan’s explicit accusation of India’s support of somehardline fundamentalist groups to strike Chinese interests, the economic corridor and the Chinese port of Gwadar within the framework of its Belt and Road initiative). The researcher will focus on following the following paths:

3.1 The US heading east expansion towards India to contain China, which known as “China’s Containment”, and the Chinese response in defense of its interests in the Belt and Road Initiative

In that atmosphere of the conflict between China and the USA in the Asian region, the documents of the ruling Communist Party of China classified the United States as a “true enemy” of China. A Chinese document dating back to 1992 says: “The United States of America, since its transformation into a single superpower, has been working hard to achieve new hegemony and prevail over power politics – all this in light of its entry into a phase of relative decline and the emergence of the limits of its capabilities” ⁽⁶¹⁾ . 

1. The researcher will try here to analyze and trace the course of US-Indian policies and plans to curb the Chinese-Pakistani influence, the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and its projects in the region), focusing on the most important (current strategies of the Chinese response with the assumption of a new era by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2012, Through the following tracks:

1. In 1995, the Chinese president Jiang Zeming declared that “the hostile forces of the West did not give up a minute from their plans to Westernize and divide our country”, while his foreign minister declared, prior to the annual meeting of the ASEAN alliance in the same year, saying that: “The United States must abandon its view of itself as the savior of the East”. Adding, “We do not acknowledge the intransigence of the United States to play the role of guarantor of peace and stability in Asia”.

1. Zi Zhongwan, Director of the American Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, confirmed that “China expressed its doubts and concerns about the US strategy in India and South Asia”. In her assessment of the US-Chinese relations during the 1990s, which she described as “fragile relations”, Zongwan said, “The main factor here is the US position on the transformation of China into a modern, relatively strong country, although the official statements remain the same. The question that still arises is: To what degree does the American awareness allow China to be strong” ⁽⁶²⁾?

1. According to Chinese professor Zi Zhongwa”, she analyzed, “America believes that China is developing by leaps and bounds and is becoming more difficult to control. In other words, the acceleration of Chinese modernization does not always seem in line with US interests”.

1. Little by little, the Chinese leaders have been repeatedly talking about “China’s active presence in the region of South and Southeast Asia, which is close to Indian interests, Pakistan and the international arena”, with the Chinese constant assertion that “China’s rise is a peaceful rise”. In a report presented to the Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2002, Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated that: “China has faced a 20-year period of strategic opportunities that would allow the country to formulate and adopt a moderate and pragmatic international strategy, focuses on local development” ⁽⁶³⁾.

1. The jewel of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor for Gwadar Port in Pakistan. It is a huge project that includes many Chinese economic and infrastructure projects throughout Pakistan, and the main points of the corridor include a network of railways and oil and gas pipelines, linking the two countries, with a length of 3000 km, at a cost of $ 62 billion, in addition to new renewable energy projects. Once the corridor was announced, it began transformation in regional alliances, as India initially opposed the corridor project and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and its extension in Pakistan, as an India’s enemy, despite China’s request for India’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, and China repeated its request to India on several occasions ⁽⁶⁴⁾.

1. Chinese and American calculations also influence the thinking of neighboring countries; for example, China has always taken a stand in support of Iran. In fact, after Iran was subjected to international sanctions in 2006 over its nuclear program, China was Iran’s main ally in breaking the sanctions. Thus, Iran does not view Chinese influence in Pakistan and Afghanistan with suspicion vision as India does as an ally of Washington. Here, we can notify the impact of the American planning to disrupt theChinese-Pakistani economic corridor of Gwadar Portthrough the alliance with India on the growing tide of fundamentalist and armed terrorist movementsin the Kashmir region and the Indian border

1. China is currently engaged in unprecedented (close bilateral cooperation with Pakistan in various fields), China is trying to show, from the domestic, regional, and international political perspective,its willingness to continue strengthening relations with Pakistan. And some Asian regional powers, such as:ran, Central Asia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodiaand others, assuming to take a positive attitude towardsresponsibility for maintaining regional order in Afghanistan and Pakistan ⁽⁶⁵⁾. 

1. Consequently, Sino-Pakistani relations in the foreseeable future, as well as theexpansion of Chinese influence in Central and South Asiawill develop further with China adopting the“one belt, one road”initiative, gradually replacing the United States, which dominates the status quo.

1. After his rise to power in 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping made“major adjustments to China’s international strategy”.China is no longer ready to play a negative and low-level role, but ratherChina has sought, according to the strategy of Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, to assume a great power position in proportion to its own strength that can affect the international system.With the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, China is trying to assume responsibility forfilling the power vacuum in a way that is acceptable to all parties concerned ⁽⁶⁶⁾.

1. China and the United States are aware that Pakistan is trying to have along-term influence on the regime in Afghanistan and are also aware that Pakistan seeks to use its influence over the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other Islamic militants to achieve political, military and economic gains from the West. However, China and the United States havevery different expectations.For this last reason, theAmerican withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2019 without threat of Pakistani blackmail, while preserving stability in Central Asia and containing the spread of Islamic militancy is an ideal outcome for all parties in the region ⁽⁶⁷⁾.

1. From the Chinese point of view, each of Afghanistan and Pakistan is a geographic center between Central and South Asia, which represents a strategic location for the development of “One Belt… One Road”,as well as being the road to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea away from India.

More importantly, theChinese government can use its influence in Pakistan and Afghanistan to contain the spread of what it deems “Islamic militancy” in “Xinjiang”, which has an Islamic concentration in China. This shows that China and the United States have an interest in allowing China to“participate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and restrict Pakistan’s maneuvers there in order to ensure its interests” ⁽⁶⁸⁾ .

1. Through the previous presentation and understanding, the Egyptian researcher concluded that,to understand the vision of China and the United States towards Pakistan from the point of view of international politics, we should highly understand the following aspects:

1. One must take into account the intertwining relations between Pakistan and the United States, India and even China itself. 

1. From my personal point of view, according to the findings of the analysis, it is necessary here to (improve the Chinese role in addition to the American role to prevent the spread of terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism in the surrounding region to Pakistan and India). 

1. This trend reflects the American concern, because if American efforts to rebuild order in Afghanistan are not preserved, there will be a power vacuum in Afghanistan,which could lead to the seizure of political power by theTaliban, the Islamic State, or even pro-Pakistan militants), which may cause (turmoil and instability in the interests of India and Washington itself. 

Therefore, if China can participate effectively in bearing the burden with the United States and exerting pressure on Pakistan), then this may be sufficient to achieve (stabilize the current political situation in Afghanistan and prevent the spread of terrorist movements in Kashmir and prevent Chinese interests in Pakistan from being hit by the Islamic terrorist militants.

3.2 The United States’ strategy to encircle the Chinese rise in Asia and the State of India and to weaken the China-Pakistan partnership and the Chinese Belt and Road initiative

The American strategic interest in East Asia and India predates the current stage in which there is much talk about this “shift” in US foreign policy since the time of President Barack Obama) and it increased in strength during the rule of former President Donald Trump, because this trend has witnessed greater momentum in custody⁽⁽⁶⁹. When the researcher tries to understand and follow Washington’s mechanisms to restrict Chinese influence in Pakistan and Southeast Asia and the Chinese response to Washington’s attempts). 

1. 1.We can here understand all the following policies and paths between all the previous parties:

1. The American administration considers the South China Sea and its surrounding areas of influence allied to Washington, such as the State of India as a fundamental national interest, has launched the so-called Asia axis, which transforms the US policy towards China from a constructive policy broadly, on common commercial interests, as well as others aimed at containing the rise of China ⁽⁷⁰⁾ .

1. Therefore, President Obama and then President Trump trips – accompanied by heavy American and India media coverage to Southeast Asia and India – was a good indication of Washington’s intention to surround and isolate China through its regional allies in the region, such as: Pakistan and Iran, chiefly the American alliance with India ⁽⁷¹⁾.

1. Given the enormous material and human potential and capabilities that China possesses, and its relentless pursuit of “China’s comprehensive and ambitious development plans”, it has been seen as the potential competitor that will challenge the United States in the new century. With the early years of the third millennium, this “Chinese challenge” was no longer just a possibility. Rather, it became a reality in many areas, according to what the facts reveal, as the “yellow giant” was able to displace the United States and occupy the top instead in terms of economic growth, production and export figures. And a block of monetary reserves and even in the position of the number one trading partner for a number of traditional Washington allies⁽⁷²⁾ . 

1. This prompted the American decision-making circles to pay greater attention to Asia in general and southeastern Asia in particular, as China aspires to be the “upper hand” there, which was expressed in the United States by the policy of “eastward direction” and “American attempt to rebalance of East Asia and the Pacific regions against the Chinese expansion” ⁽⁷³⁾.

1. According to what was stated by the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan Sun Weidong, in an interview, on June 24, 2016, with Xinhua News Agency; he confirmed that “the current achievements of the cooperation projects between China and Pakistan focus on four areas”: energy and infrastructure projects, transportation, Gwadar port, and industrial cooperation. Major energy projects include (construction of a solar power plant) by the Chinese company Zunergy; Work has already started on more than half of the remaining 16 planned energy projects.

1. In terms of transportation infrastructure, the Pakistani Highway (KKH) business is being rebuilt and developed inside Pakistan, and in March 2016 construction of the Karachi-Lahore highway began with the help of China. With regard to (Development of Gwadar Port), on January 11, 2015, Pakistan handed over more than 280 hectares of Pakistani land use rights to a Chinese company for forty-three years, and construction of new facilities has already begun ⁽⁷⁴⁾ 

1. Chinese enterprises in Pakistan established under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative already employ more than 6000 Pakistani workers; Evidence that the close relationship between China and Pakistan has already moved from the (policy announcement to the project implementation phase); As the amount of money disbursed, the depth of exchange, and the number of participants is unprecedented in the relations of the two countries ⁽⁷⁵⁾ .

1. It is also important to note that the relationship between China and Pakistan is not without some problems), such as:

1. First: The Chinese government has doubts that what it describes as the “fundamentalists terrorists of Chinese Uighurs ay Xinjiang”, they were “setting off from Pakistan and running training camps for them in the country”, and that these were directly related to the “violence incidents” that occurred in “Xinjiang” (East Turkestan).

1. Second: Fundamentalism has spread rapidly in recent years in the Muslim “Xinjiang” region in northwest China. Where there were a large number of attacks. As a result, the Chinese government is very interested in Pakistan’s readiness, ability and determination to combat what it describes as “Islamic terrorism”.

1. Third: China is also concerned about the continued failure of the United States to rebuild a successful political system in Afghanistan, especially the ambiguous role that Pakistan played in Afghanistan); Pakistan was (supporting ostensibly the political system built by the US-led coalition, but also surreptitiously supporting the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda.

1. Fourth: Therefore, China recently expressed its desire to participate in the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban movement, and this means that (due to the strong influence of China on Pakistan, it may be better qualified than the United States to play the role of mediator in achieving peace in Afghanistan, This is what the United States of America and its ally India strongly reject), so as not to upset the balance in the region in favor of Pakistan and China ⁽⁷⁶⁾ .

1. Ostensibly, (India as an ally to the USA in the Asian region to counter the Chinese influence confirms that its “rejection of the Belt and Road project” is due to its passage in the Pakistani regions of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan), as India confirms its ownership of these areas ⁽⁷⁷⁾. In fact, Indian rejection of the project is due to other (four reasons), namely:

1. First: The success of the corridor would strengthen China’s position as a regional hegemon, and indeed a great power, and this harms the standing of the United States, an ally of India.

1. Second: If the project is successful, Pakistan – India’s historic rival – will become a “stronger and more stable regional and economic actor”, and this may harm the Indian benefits and allies in the region.

1. Third: This project does not bother India alone, but also America, as the United States considers the Chinese project in Pakistan a great threat to its hegemony and its status as a great power in the Asian region.

1. Fourth: We find that China’s primary goal is to take advantage of the deep port of Gwadar, strategically located in Pakistan, in order to secure the energy field. Thus, both projects bring a strategic and economic advantage to Pakistan and China, and this may harm the American existence in the Asian region and India ⁽⁷⁸⁾.

1. Hence, we conclude that there is, therefore, competition between two divergent trends, namely: China’s ambition to enhance its regional and international role in proportion to the growth of its capabilities, especially the economic, and the United States’ endeavor to preserve its interests and its position as well. And since the (geopolitical field) in which many of the interests of the American and Chinese sides revolve is the same, especially in the areas surrounding the countries of India, Pakistan and South Asia, dealing with the conflict of interests and their contradiction between China and the United States between them seems open to various possibilities, such as:

1. Starting with the possibility of coexistence and an attempt to settle difference between Washington and Beijing.

1. Through the possibility of coordination and partnership) between the two parties.

And up to the escalation and direct confrontation between China and its allies in the Asian region, such as: Pakistan, Iran, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia, the United States of America and its alliesin the Asian region, on top of them isIndia and the surrounding powers ⁽⁷⁹⁾.

According to the mentioned analysis, the Egyptian researcher can briefly summarize and conclude this part, though understanding the extent of the importance of Pakistan to China, because Pakistan has an important role for China in ensuring a stable regional order in Central and South Asia and preventing the spread of “terrorism” to China, especially in the Muslim region of “Xinjiang”, which is what Beijing assumes great importance in its relations and its focus in Southeast Asia, despite the concern that this represents to both India and the United States of America.

3.3 Indicators on the growing (tide of fundamentalist and armed terrorist movements) in the Kashmir region and the Indian border: Analyzing of the American plans and policies in partnership with India to weaken Chinese influence and extend the “Belt and Road Initiative” across Pakistan within (Economic Corridor “CPEC” and Gwadar Port) 

Recently, especially after Trump assumed the presidency in 2016, America replaced Pakistan the state of India as Washington’s main ally in South Asia, and it supported India in an attempt to nullify Chinese influence. In 2018, the White House suspended $ 2 billion from military aid to Pakistan), while the United States simultaneously supported India with economic and military partnerships. At a time when India and Afghanistan have become a partner with America, Pakistan finds itself paired with its iron ally China) ⁽⁸⁰⁾. 

1. The American plans to weaken the Chinese influence in Pakistan and India are represented by:

1. To disrupt the economic corridor, Pakistan accuses the United States of continuing to create and support the dispute in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, which is located at the heart of the Gwadar Corridor in Pakistan.

1. For example, in July 2016, America added the Liberal Group to its terrorist list – which is an armed Islamic faction that has split from the Pakistan Taliban movement, which aims to implement Islamic law in Pakistan – and from time to time adopts attacks against religious minorities and government institutions. This raised the concern of both China and Pakistan, as the targeting of the White House of several terrorist organizations along the Afghan-Pakistani borders, led to an “increase in the spread of terrorism in Pakistan” ⁽⁸¹⁾.

1. According to the “Chinese and Pakistani vision”, the repetition of this trend and the American move to include terrorist groups on its list of terrorism, led to many terrorists fleeing to Baluchistan region, due to the ongoing Pakistani military operations in the tribal areas under the neighboring federal administration.

1. Once the USA has declared “Al-Ahrar as a terrorist group” in July 2016, the group’s attacks in Baluchistan spread, killing 135 people, most of them in Quetta region between August and September 2016.

1. Here, analysts confirm, that it is not known whether this effort by America to damage the corridor was deliberate or not, but the result was expected. Here many Chinese and Pakistani analysts, politicians, and military officers agree with the prominent Pakistani politician Balwasha Khan, who said that the US-Indian relationship is striving to undermine the Chinese initiative and the corridor ⁽⁸²⁾.

1. Here the Pakistani and Chinese vision confirms that “although the terrorist groups in Baluchistan have calmed down, they openly accuse that the spread of India’s activity and the financing of terrorist groups stationed in Baluchistan”, such as the “Baluchistan Liberation Army” (BLA), continue to sabotage Pakistan and the project The Chinese Gwadar Corridor is continuing, in cooperation with the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) jointly in the “Baluchistan Project” to strike at Pakistani interests.

1. There are many accusations by the “Pakistani Intelligence Agency” (ISI) for both India and Washington of causing the spread of terrorist groups to strike the of Pakistan and Chinese interests” ⁽⁸³⁾. 

1. In 2016, “Nizar Baloch”, who is the Chairman of the Baloch Liberation Front supported by the Indian Research and Analysis Wing, stated publicly that he welcomed all India’s aid and promised more attacks on the Chinese Gwadar Corridor in Pakistan.

1. Pakistan accused the Indian wing, through its agents, of organizing many killings of Chinese engineers in the Baluchistan region, and these operations were organized on Chinese workers in the corridor intentionally to isolate China from Pakistan.

1. Also Pakistan’s accusations against India and the United States of supporting terrorism against China’s interests in the Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan continued. For example, in November 2018, the Chinese consulate in Karachi was attacked by the Baluchistan Liberation Army, and after the investigation, “Amir Sheikh”, the Inspector General of Police, has informed the press and the public that the “attack in Afghanistan was planned by the mastermind of the terrorist Liberation Army with the support of the Indian Research and Analysis Wing” ⁽⁸⁴⁾.

1. And there are analysts who confirm that both the United States and India have sought to strengthen relations with Afghanistan, which is neighboring Baluchistan, and have become close friends at the expense of Pakistan. Perhaps the main reason cited by analysts for this is New Delhi and Washington continuing to pressure Pakistan between pro-India Afghanistan and India that is already hostile to Pakistan.

1. Moreover, Pakistani side accuses India of using the lands of Afghanistan to finance and train Baloch dissidents from Pakistan. Here, the American analyst “Webster Tarpley” confirms this, pointing out that the Indian Research and Analysis Wing is recruiting terrorists from Afghanistan, to help them engage in terrorism inside Pakistan and to strike Chinese influence there in favor of Washington ⁽⁸⁵⁾.

1. In March 2016, the “Pakistani Intelligence Agency” (ISI) revealed the “arrest of a spy working for the “Indian Research and Analysis Wing”, called “Kolboshan Badav”, who admitted in a video clip that he was “an agent of the Indian wing and carried out operations to destabilize Pakistan and the Chinese corridor project in Port Gwadar”, and informed the Pakistani authorities that “he was stationed in the Iranian port city of Chabahar, under the name “Mubarak Battal”. With regard to the “Baloch terrorist groups”, the terrorist “Kolboshan Badav” revealed that the meetings that he was organizing were aimed at knowing that the destinations and objectives of the Indian wing to “carry out various terrorist activities within Baluchistan region in order to properly hand over to and support the terrorists of any requirements they needed, under the supervision of the officials of the Indian wing” ⁽⁸⁶⁾. 

1. The most important thing on the Pakistani side is what the terrorist “Kolboshan Badav” mentioned, and he said regarding the China-Pakistan corridor project through Gwadar port, that: “The area between Gwadar and China must be destroyed and disrupted by spreading the rebellion inside Baluchistan and the Crunchy regions”.

1. From here, we note the “successive accusations of China and its ally Pakistan of colluding America and India in all these and terrorist crimes and operations” against Pakistan and China to strike (Chinese projects for the Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan and South Asia). They have accused and mentioned that “America constantly supports India’s plans to cause havoc in Baluchistan and other regions of Pakistan, with the aim of their policy of isolating Pakistan from its ally China, and weakening the economic corridor project for the Chinese port of Gwadar in Pakistan”.

On the other hand, we note the Chinese-Pakistani efforts against terrorist groups, accusing both India and United States of America of supporting them, as the apparent efforts made by the Pakistani army in cooperation and support of the Chinese side to protect its interests in the Belt and Road Chinese initiative led to “striking and encircling terrorist groups in Baluchistan And the tribal areas under the federal administration of Pakistan and the normalization of the security situation” ⁽⁸⁷⁾. 

Hence, the researcher concludes that the successive acts of violence in Pakistan that harm along the lines of Chinese interests in the “port of Gwadar”, which is the most important project for theBelt and Road Chinese Initiative. With the accusations of China and Pakistan against India and Washington, and their responsibility for violence, fundamentalist tide and support for the “Pakistan Taliban Movement”, Pakistan’s first domestic enemy. But the most important thing is China’s keenness to make the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects a success, and make them on the right path, and China’s desire to speed up the successful completion of many corridor projects, while work continues on many other projects.

4. Reasons for China’s support to Pakistan against India and the United States in combating terrorism, and the joint Indian-American response strategies against them

Since the mid-1950s, China has endeavored to introduce some modifications to the traditional concept of non-interference in internal affairs contained in the United Nations Charter. Instead of adopting the concept of “non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries”, China has adopted the concept of “mutual non-interference in internal affairs”, with the aim of emphasizing the withdrawal of the principle of non-interference on bilateral relations between countries, and giving the principle of non-interference a more reciprocal meaning in international relations. And not only the United Nations interfering in the internal affairs of member states, as indicated in the text of Article (2), paragraph (7) of the United Nations Charter. The Chinese commitment to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs has deepened, with the Chinese constitution itself incorporating this principle ⁽⁸⁸⁾.

  Despite the increasing relative importance of China within the global system, against the backdrop of its economic and military rise, this did not follow the Chinese declaration of its freedom from commitment to the principle of non-interference, as it still declares its strong adherence to this principle. It uses the issuance of several national documents to confirm its adherence to it. However, this does not negate the preoccupation of the Chinese political and academic elites with the feasibility of adhering to this principle, not only against the backdrop of the continuing change in the global balance of power structure and the distribution of economic and military capabilities, but also against the background of the emergence of an expected strong Chinese need to preserve the Chinese interests that are spreading over a wide range within most regions and within a growing number of Asian and global economies, as well as the spread of Chinese investments and labor within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative with its land and sea components, especially in the economic corridor of China in Pakistan and the “Pakistani port of Gwadar” with Chinese investments), which imposes the need to attend Chinese security and military forces to protect these interests, especially in Pakistan and on the common borders between it and India⁽⁸⁹⁾. 

So, the researcher will focus on the “new Chinese security rapprochement” and the main “Chinese principles to intervene for combating terrorism in outside missions”, through the following mechanisms.

4.1 Principles and Theories of “Chinese regional and global flexibility security responsibility” to protect its growing interests

Although China has not officially announced its abandonment of the principle of non-interference, but there are many studies that have monitored indications affirming that China has actually diverted from this principle in practice. There are also Chinese academics who are still calling strongly for a reconsideration of this principle, based on the assumption that it no longer corresponds to China’s position within the international system, and that it puts Chinese foreign policy in trouble, especially with the expansion of Chinese interests in the world, and that, in contrast to what adhering to this principle has achieved in sparing China great costs during previous decades, but it will not Be appropriate during the coming period. They also argue that this principle is no longer compatible with the “principle of Chinese responsibility” as an important international power. Some Chinese academics have proposed what can be called “creative intervention” as an alternative to the principle of non-interference ⁽⁹⁰⁾.

1. And some studies have argued that China’s continued adherence to the principle of non-interference has become a “dilemma”, in light of the contradiction of continued adherence to this principle with a number of considerations, the most important of which are:

1. The relative weight of China within the global system, on the economic and military levels, and the “rapid growth of Chinese interests in various regions”. In many of these regions, the “security environment is fragile and vulnerable like Pakistan”, so, China is trying to defend its interest in these regions.

1. The continuous Chinese assertion that “China is a responsible country”, as one of the gateways used to reduce Western and regional concerns about the rise of China and respond to the “Chinese threat theory”. However, this “Chinese responsibility may require intervention in some cases” ⁽⁹¹⁾.

1. China issued for the first time an“anti-terrorism law in December 2015”, the Chinese law included an “explicit provision permitting sending Chinese forces abroad to combat terrorism abroad”. Article 71 of the Chinese Law stipulates that:“After the approval of the concerned countries, and after the approval of the State Council of China, the Public Security Department of the State Council and the National Security Department, China can send personnel on counter-terrorism missions outside the country”. Giving the right to the “Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the People’s Police, and the Chinese armed forces” to send personnel outside the country on anti-terrorism missions after the “approval of the Central Military Commission” ⁽⁹²⁾.

1. In fact, “China is exposed on some occasions to Western criticism for not supporting the policy of international intervention in necessary cases”, as well as ignoring human rights violations in some developing countries, which contradicts – according to many Western writings- with the idea of ​​a “responsible state”.

1. Related to this, “China is already seeking to play a greater role in providing public security services”, especially in the areas of combating piracy, drug trafficking, and rescue efforts.

The increasing need to “protect Chinese citizens abroad”, especially with the increase in the size of Chinese communities and workers in the areas of work of Chinese companies abroad, and in countries located on the path of the Belt and Road like Pakistan⁽⁹³⁾.

According to this trend, China’s adherence to the “principle of non-interference will become a “luxury” or a “burden” for Chinese policy in the near future. In addition, the shift from this principle may bring about a number of gains for China, the most important of which is improving its global image as a “responsible country” within the global system on the ground of its adherence to the new principles governing this system and global policies. This shift will create “greater flexibility in China’s ability to protect its growing interests” in the world.

4.2 Approving a new amendment to the “Chinese National Defense Law”, on December 26, 2020 to allow China to play a security role outside its borders 

1.   In a remarkable development, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (Parliament) approved, on December 26, 2020, an important amendment to the “Chinese National Defense Law”, allowing China to play a security role outside its borders, to be implemented on January 1, 2021 ⁽⁹⁴⁾. Here the recent amendment to the Chinese National Defense Law and its motives cannot be understood independently of the timing of its promulgation, in terms of:

1. The amended law came after a period of tension in Sino-US relations during the Trump administration: the latter began to impose successive packages of US tariffs against Chinese goods on the US market, starting from mid-2018, which turned into a trade war between the two parties. Although China and the United States of America reached an “interim agreement” on January 15, 2020 to end this war, but other aspects of the conflict between the two sides continued.

1. The “Covid-19” pandemic came to add another area of ​​conflict between the US and Chinese sides, and US accusations against China, whether about the nature of the origin of the virus or the extent of Chinese responsibility for it:in addition to other arenas of contention, most notably fifth generation “5G” technology, and these issues are related. The controversy is in confrontational language, especially on the part of the US President Trump ⁽⁹⁵⁾.

1. The “Revised China National Defense Law” in December 2020 came a few weeks before the new US administration the Biden administration assumed its duties, adding a dangerous dimension to the Chinese approach towards Washington and the new administration: Therefore, the new revised Chinese law represents a clear Chinese message to the new American administration about China’s role within the global system, and that it is ready to move forward in any direction that the Biden administration wants.

1. On the other hand, the amended Chinese National Defense Law can be understood as establishing new rules for Sino-American relations before the Biden administration arrived: despite the theoretical disagreement that arose during the election period about the nature of these relations in the Biden phase, as there was a tendency to emphasize However, these US-Chinese relations will witness a review by Biden, as well as there is consensus about an almost certain change in the nature of the American rhetoric towards China, but it seems the latter was keen to confirm its role within the global system, regardless of the nature of attitudes of the Biden administration towards it ⁽⁹⁶⁾.

1. The most likely trend is that the Chinese assessment of the US policy experience towards it in recent years during the term of Trump and the advent of the Biden administration expresses a stable structural shift in American orientations: During the last three years before President Joe Biden came to power the United States, and during the period of Trump, the Chinese politicians and analysts concluded that the shift in this policy does not express a special, or exceptional, position of President Trump, as much as it represents a stable character of the US policy towards China.

China’s view is that even if the US policy witnessed a relative shift in the Biden era, it would remain limited to the nature of American discourse without an actual positive change in the America’s approach to China: With the Chinese elites believing that issuing this law is important now, because China It does not have the luxury to wait for the new direction of the administration in Washington led by Biden, and this is supported by the existence of strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific region, behind which other regional powers have stood before the United States itself⁽⁹⁷⁾.

Perhaps the most prominent worthy observation of our analysis here according to the Egyptian researcher’s vision through her reading of the official Chinese sources, is that the Chinese sources did not present nor explain or explain any sufficient details about the amended text of the Chinese Defense Law in December 2020, whether regarding the nature of this new Chinese security role, or the nature of the Chinese security forces or institutions that will assume this role, or the basic conditions that must be fulfilled before this role becomes a duty by virtue of this new defense law in China, or whether there are specific geographical destinations or theaters for Chinese foreign movement to establish Law. 

1. Here, we can find that the “Chinese sources” were satisfied with stressing that “the new Chinese defense role will be unique” in protecting stability and peace across the world, and that the Chinese military policy is a defensive policy and stands with peace and against war.

The strategies of the Indian lobby to practice political pressures influence on the American administration to stand with the Indian government against China and Pakistan to fight fundamentalism and terrorist militants 

The “Indian lobby” pressed the American administration to form a “counter-alliance or Asian NATO against China and Pakistan in South and Southeast Asia”, which prompted the American administration and its decision-making centers to draw up the American plan to form a new Asian NATO, similar to the “North Atlantic Treaty”to counter the increasing Chinese influence, by reviving the Quartet, which includes the United States of America, Japan, Australia and India, which held its first meeting on October 6, 2020 in the Japanese capital Tokyo, at the level of foreign ministers of member states⁽⁹⁸⁾. The most important features of the (new Asian NATO), which includes four countries, as we mentioned, can be observed, as follows.

5.1 The pressures of the “Indian Lobby” in Washington to form an “Asian alliance” to confront the Chinese dragon and combating terrorism in Pakistan and the Asian region

1. This quadruple nucleus for the formation of the New Asian Alliance, which includes the United States of America, Japan, Australia and India, is the cornerstone of the US plan to form new alliances after it turned its attention to the Asia Pacific region and confronting the phenomenon of terrorism in Pakistan and the Chinese power ⁽⁹⁹⁾. It began to shake the throne of the United States in dominating the world economically and militarily, and the most important items and foundations upon which Asian NATO, led by the United States of America are based, are:

1. The quadripartite dialogue between the Asian countries of NATO aims to develop a common vision to preserve maritime security, electronic and critical technologies, infrastructure, combating terrorism, regional cooperation, confronting Chinese influence and expansion, especially “after the increase of Chinese tension and hostility towards New Delhi after the border dispute in the Himalayas mountains” ⁽¹⁰⁰⁾.

1. India was previously reluctant to enter the Asian Quartet with Washington not to disturb its neighbor China, but India is now under pressure from the Indian Lobby in Washington to accelerate its steps towards the American camp to enhance its military and security capabilities.

1. The desire of the United States in the recent period the formation of the Asian NATO under the USA leadership with India to confront Pakistan and China as its biggest supporter has increased is that the Trump administration has not abandoned the accusation of Beijing of spreading the Coronavirus pandemic and intensified the hostility to China during the election campaign. To the former US President Donald Trump.

1. As for Washington, the “main danger is from China”, According to Washington and its ally India, with mentioning that “anti-China alliances” must be created primarily by US interests. As for Japan, which has close commercial and political relations with China, it is confused between the jaws of the American and Chinese pincers, and Tokyo wants American influence to continue in the region to protect “Washington’s traditional allies” ⁽¹⁰¹⁾.

The current political developments, global fluctuations and the imbalance in the balance of power came to impose itself strongly on Washington to enter into a cold war with China, after it was with the former Soviet Union, and therefore Washington began to motivate its allies, led by India, to join this new alliance, and it may be Canada The new member, especially after the Canadian-Chinese relations worsened recently, and the capital, Ottawa, became more aggressive after the arrest of a senior official in Chinese Huawei in 2018, and Canada sent several warships to the Taiwan Strait in September 2020 to arouse Beijing’s anger ⁽¹⁰²⁾.

Here, the Egyptian researcher sees that China considers US moves and alliances in South and Southeast Asia directed against it, and contributes to fabricating crises with its neighbors to strengthen hostile alliances against Beijing, and Beijing is trying to downplay this new American alliance, which it considers aims to tighten the screws on it. By blocking the flow of oil to China through the Strait of Malacca to limit Chinese economic growth. In turn, the economically superior of China seeks to limit US attempts to impede its growth and tighten the screws on it, by going to build economic alliances through the Belt and Road Initiative with all Asian countries to put pressures on Washington and its allies in the Asian region. Consequently, you will not find benefit from Washington’s attempts to exert pressure on Beijing and encircle it in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

5.2 The role of the “Indian Lobby in the United States to make India as the center of an “effective role in bringing peace and security to the region in the face of extremist religious fundamentalisms

India seeks to expand its political and military influence regionally and internationally, and has become one of the main players in southern Asia. Therefore, the Indian Lobby in Washington plays a dual role in encouraging the American decision-maker for rapprochement with India as an emerging country and making use of its capabilities in a number of files of importance to The United States, especially with the coming of the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party to power, is a party with Hindu nationalist tendencies that represents the rich in India, and therefore tends towards the West and is seen as China and Pakistan as a formidable enemies, and it also has problems with Muslims in the Jammu and Kashmir region And all this increases the rapprochement of the Indian government through the influence of the Indian lobby formed by the Haratiya Janata Party from Washington) ⁽¹⁰³⁾. 

1. Here we can identify the most important roles of the “Indian Lobby” in bringing about (rapprochement in the security file between India and Washington), as follows:

1. The Indian Lobby pressured on the US State Department for security rapprochement with India against China and Pakistan. In a visit by the US Secretary of State to India in 2018, he expressed his vision of the nature of the role that America wants from India by saying: India needs a reliable partner in international forums like the USA, and I would like to I say it frankly that the United States of America is this reliable partner, due to our common values ​​and our identical vision of security and stability in the world, and China challenges and violates international laws through provocations in the South China Sea.

1. Washington, then does not want to lose positions in the war of influence against Beijing in the region, and sees India as a powerful agent that can help it increase its military and political influence at China’s expense from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. The United States is also seeking to develop its political relations with India, which is evident in Washington’s involvement of New Delhi in the ongoing peace process in Afghanistan ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾.

1. With regard to the military relations between the United States and India, the American envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Alice Wells said that the United States considers India a great strategic partner, and wishes that New Delhi adopt an effective role in bringing peace and security to the region.

1. For emphasizing the importance of security rapprochement between India and Washington, “Mrs. Wells” the US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan said that: “Washington has offered New Delhi to provide it with sensitive military equipment suitable for multiple uses. Washington has provided only a few of its allies with such equipment, so giving sensitive weapons to New Delhi means that Washington pays great attention to its military relations with India, to create a strong element in the region through which it can obstruct Chinese hegemony” ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾.

1. The United States is working to develop its relations with India, during the past years; Washington sold weapons to New Delhi for 15 billion dollars, and plans to launch military projects in Indiaduring the next years with 30 billion dollars.

In July 2018 India launched massive naval maneuvers with the United States and Japan, off its southern coasts, with the aim of strengthening its military relations, in the face of the growing Chinese influence in the region. These maneuvers took place in conjunction with the escalation of confrontations between Indian and Chinese forces, in a remote and strategically sensitive area in the Himalayas, where the borders of India, China and Bhutan meet ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾.

1. Hence, the Egyptian researcher concluded that the strategic objectives of the United States have converged with the growth of its relations with India, through three axes:

The completion of the encirclement of Pakistan and Afghanistan from southeastern Asia.

1. The containment of China, the candidate force to compete with the United States in the current century.

The suppression of radical fundamentalist movements in the Asian region.

5.3 Alliances of the Indian Lobby with Christian fundamentalists in the USA to support India’s policies in confronting religious fundamentalism and extremism in Pakistan and Asia: Focusing on Indian proxy war in Afghanistan against Pakistan with Washington’s help 

1. After Donald Trump took office, President Trump appointed many Christian fundamentalists within his administration, which made conservatives and the Indian Lobby in Washington see him as a “savior” for Washington’s support for India’s policies against terrorist militias in Pakistan and Asia⁽¹⁰⁷⁾. We can look at the impact of this alliance between the (Indian lobby in Washington and Christian fundamentalists) on (the American administration), through:

1. This alliance between the Indian lobby and the conservative Christian fundamentalist in Washington, is relying on the dominant position of the United States, sought to strengthen the country’s security policies as a necessity to preserve its international position, including conducting precautionary attacks against countries that pose a threat to the vision and goals of the United States, on top of it is China and its support for Pakistan and the fundamentalist movements in South Asia, according to their vision⁽¹⁰⁸⁾.

1. The previous alliance works at the same time promoting the spread of American values ​​in India, Asia and around the world, monitoring the adoption of those values, and exerting pressure against countries, especially China and Pakistan in a manner consistent with the level of their implementation of American values.

1. The attempt to encircle China is not the only importance of the American rapprochement with India, as there are many other files, such as: the Afghan file is strongly present, as Afghanistan is a country in which an Indian proxy war against Pakistan has been going on, and the United States has been involved in the Afghan quagmire for nearly 15 years, and President Trump’s administration bears responsibility for all of this on Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, according to the viewpoint of the American administration, under the direction and pressure of the Indian lobby in Washington.

1. And now the Indian Lobby with the fundamentalist Christians is pressing for the Indian and American interests converge in Afghanistan against Pakistan and China, as the United States seeks to (include India in its new strategy on the war on terror in Afghanistan and against Pakistan), which is evidence Tangible on the growing alliance between them ⁽¹⁰⁹⁾.

1. The US President Donald Trump announced, shortly after his ascension to the leadership of the White House, new changes in Washington’s policies that included Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. President Trump said, “The new change in his country’s policy towards Afghanistan will be based on” circumstances, rather than time, indicating that the US military’s mission in Afghanistan will end with the improvement of security conditions in it, and it is not linked to a specific date. 

1. We can notify that Trump in his converging strategy with India, under the pressures of both the Indian Lobby, which cooperates with the Christian fundamentalists accused of the state of Pakistan of giving sanctuary to terrorists, which Islamabad rejected and called on him to abandon this rhetoric ⁽¹¹⁰⁾.

1. It is considered the Indian-American rapprochement in the Afghan affairs, under pressure from the Indian lobby comes categorically at the expense of India’s neighboring country, which is Pakistan, which is what called Pakistan to reject any role for India in resolving the Afghan crisis.

1. What prompted the Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi to warn before the United Nations General Assembly, saying, “India cannot make any contribution to achieving peace in Afghanistan”.

The statement of the Prime Minister of Pakistan Abbasi is the strongest message that Pakistan sends to America, in response to the efforts to rapprochement between Washington and New Delhi under the pretext of fighting terrorism against Pakistan, as it appeared to Pakistan and its Chinese protector that the United States is also biased towards the Indian position on the issue of Indian-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan claims sovereignty over it, and the final result that theU.S. suspended at least $900 million in security aid to Pakistan ⁽¹¹¹⁾.

Through the previous analysis, the Egyptian researcher concluded that the Indian lobby in Washington, in cooperation with the ruling “Bharatiya Janata Party” in India, was able to form alliances in the United States, especially with the “Christian Right” in order to exert pressures on Washington for “security rapprochement” with India’s government to combat terrorism and fundamentalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to form a parallel and anti-China-Pakistan alliance, which led to strong objections from the Chinese-backed Pakistani side in the United Nations. This led to the emergence of power balances and proxy wars between both India’s proxy war against terrorism in Afghanistan in favor of Washington, and Pakistan’s war against the penetration and expansion of Indian pro-Washington influence in the region with the support of its Chinese ally.

6. The future expected political and security risks and scenarios for Chinese security involvement in Pakistan to defense of its interests in its relationship with the West and the United States 

Regardless of the extent of the Chinese commitment to the principle of non-interference, there are indications that China has practically turned away from this principle. Therefore, a distinction must be made here between the theoretical commitment to this principle, and the Chinese policies on the ground. This intervention took different appearances or patterns, the most prominent of which was China sending its envoys to different countries to urge these countries to adopt / refrain from certain behaviors, this happened in the case of North Korea, Sudan, and Myanmar, or to intervene with the aim of influencing the course of internal conflicts or interactions, specific intervention in Zimbabwe in 2008 to support the Robert Mugabe regime by providing military support, as well as the extensive Chinese integration into the activities of peacekeeping operations supported and supervised by the United Nations. 

China in 2019 became the largest contributor to those operations among the permanent members in the Security Council, ranked eleventh in the world, and Chinese support for many international military intervention operations through the passage of Security Council resolutions, whether through explicit approval of these decisions or abstaining from exercising the right of veto against them” ⁽¹¹²⁾. 

In the following sections, the Egyptian researcher will try to explain and analyze the future results of the Chinese intervention in Pakistan to protect its interests in the Belt and Road Initiative on its overall relations with Washington, India and the West, through the following axes:

6.1 The expected potential implications on Chinese interests for its support to Pakistani strategy in fighting “fundamentalism and terrorism” and the results of the Chinese shift from the principle of “non-interference” in the Pakistani case on India and the USA

1. The Chinese shift from the principle of non-interference in the Pakistani case will entail a set of expected political and material burdens and costs on China, the most important of which are the following:

1. The expected political and security risks in the relationship with the West and the United States: a shift from this principle does not necessarily guarantee an expansion of the size and scope of the Sino-American consensus, given that the principle of intervention by the United States and Western powers is not really related to spreading democracy or imposing respect for human rights or Protection of civilians, as it is related to “building and protecting areas of global influence”.

1. There is a difference in the relative weight of the political and economic components in the concept of “responsibility” for both China and the Western powers: while the West attaches more importance to the political component in the concept of responsibility, China still pays greater attention to the economic component of this responsibility, whether in its relationship to the global economic system or in relation to developing countries ⁽¹¹³⁾.

1. The damage that could be caused to the positive global image of China, especially within developing and emerging countries: an image that was based in part on China’s adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and political unconditional ties. Even if we assume that China’s shift from the principle of non-interference may lead to an improvement in Sino-Western relations, this may come at the expense of China’s relations with developing and emerging countries. Also, this shift may enhance the spread of the “Chinese threat theory”.

1. For the first time, China implemented a multilateral formula to deal with security challenges in a number of neighboring countries: This mechanism, in addition to China, included Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistanwithin the framework of what is known as the “Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism” (QCCM), which was launched in August 2016. Under this formula, two important agreements were signed in August 2017, namely: the Agreement on the Coordination Mechanism in Counterterrorism by Afghanistan-China-Pakistan-Tajikistan Armed Forces, and the Protocol Concerning the Information Coordination Center for Combating Terrorism by the Armed Forces of the Four Countries “Armed Forces”, which are: Afghanistan-China-Pakistan-Tajikistan ⁽¹¹⁴⁾.

Although there are no details about the content of these above mentioned two agreements, important and significant developments followed them: the most important of which is the deployment of Chinese forces in Tajikistan near the Afghan Wakhan Corridor, and near the Chinese Xinjiang region. The mode of cooperation with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan was aimed primarily at confronting terrorist organizations within the borders of fragile states, in addition to their important location on the Chinese Belt and Road tracks.

Hence, the researcher concluded that the Chinese support to Pakistan in the face of Indian and American pressure on its support for terrorism has led totheincreased directed accusations against China of its external interference in the Indian issue by supporting Pakistan. What increased the size of Western and international pressure on China is the exposure of its ally Pakistan to international pressures regarding the growth of armed fundamentalist movements and militias, and the threat of the interests of India, as an ally of Washington in the region. This led to an increase in the complexities and security networks in South and Southeast Asia.

6.2 The future impacts of the American withdrawal from fighting terrorism in Afghanistan on the growing of the fundamentalism tide in South and Southeast Asia: Indian and Pakistani cases: Analyzing the effects on the Chinese security internal strategy at Xinjiang Province 

1. There is a conviction in India that Pakistan is keeping its bleeding in theJammu Kashmir region, the Indian sidethrough Pakistan’s support for the armed movements and providing security protection for the armed groups hostile to India, and facilitating theinfiltration of foreign mercenaries to the Indian side of Kashmir to launch armed operations against the Indian army and security forces there,which led to the severity of thecrisis of the growing fundamentalism and terrorism between India and Pakistan is the American withdrawal from Afghanistan,which resulted in theincrease in China’s fear of terrorists and al-Qaeda entering the Chinese territories, especially the “Xinjiang” region with a Muslim majority,and these fundamentalist and terrorist armed groups are trying to exploit the state of tension Security is a result of Washington’s withdrawal from Afghanistanand penetration into the Kashmiri region from India, the recruitment of more local Kashmiri Indians, and the arrival of several Muslim minorities in several Asian countries, especially the Chinese Muslim minorities in Xinjiang ⁽¹¹⁵⁾. So, the researcher will try to analyze a number of negative influences, resulting from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan on the “internal security” of China, Pakistan and India, as follows:

1. India and China have tried to reduce tension between them and to takesteps to build confidence and maintain calm and security along the borders between them after the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in order to preserve regional stability,butthe Sino-Pakistani rapprochementcauses concern to decision-makers in India, especially China’s projects in theEconomic Corridor and the Pakistani port of Gwadar, as well as Beijing’s failure to support an Indian decision in the “Security Council” to consider the founder of the Army of Muhammad movement as a “global terrorist leader”, which led to tension in security relations between China and India and its ally Washington in South Asia ⁽¹¹⁶⁾. 

1. In this context,Chinese security relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan have witnessed important developments in recent years: reflecting China’s tendency to review its security approach in the Central and South Asian regions), starting from 2014. This trend has been reinforced by a number of variables, most notably⁽¹¹⁷⁾:

The United States reduced the size of its military presence in Afghanistan.

1. But the most important variable is related to the expected increase in the Chinese openness of Xinjiang to South and Central Asia within the framework of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects, which increases opportunities for terrorist elements from Pakistan, Afghanistan and other surrounding regions to penetrate into Xinjiang.

1. Chinese fear of increasing opportunities for communication between religious organizations in Xinjiang and their counterparts in South and Central Asia and Pakistan. This has given Tajikistan a great importance as a buffer zone on the Chinese borders ⁽¹¹⁸⁾.

1. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan led to the growing phenomenon of armed violence in the Kashmiri region from India and China’s fear of negative extensions to the “Muslim Xinjiang” region, and the escalation began between the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the government of Pakistan backed by China and the exchange of accusations between them. The Indian government refused to negotiate with the Pakistani-backed Kashmiri separatist leaders, according to the Indian and American accusations against them, and killed many more local Indian militants than foreigners, which is a new phenomenon and not as it was in the past ⁽¹¹⁹⁾ .

1. According to Indian and Chinese security sources and reports. Some security intentions attributed to the political vacuum in the region after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, which led to the deterioration of the security situation, and the continuous armed confrontations increased, especially between the Indian security forces and the Kashmiri militants, which increased the rate of extremism in the state of Kashmir, and the tendency towards arms by the people, besides the high tensions along the line of contact in the disputed region between India and Pakistan and the mutual accusations between them of violating the ceasefire truce signed between the two parties), and each party rejected the mediation of China and the United States to calm and each side interfered to support its ally ⁽¹²⁰⁾ .

What increased the pressure on China was the exposure of its ally Pakistan to international pressure, which prompted the government of Pakistan to ban the activities of the armed group and put its leader under house arrest, but the Pakistani armed group carried out its operations and practiced its activities under other names. India tried to place the leader of Pakistan’s Frozen Army Movement under the list of international terrorism in the United Nations, but China opposed the resolution, which led to an increase in security tensions between China and India for its support for Pakistan in the UN Security Council, and India’s refusal to cooperate with Pakistan after the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, which led to the increase of the tensions in the region, and China’s fear has being increased of the terrorism tide from South Asia across the mountains in Afghanistan and its borders with the Chinese Muslim province of “Xinjiang” and the negative impact of China internal security ⁽¹²¹⁾.

1. these previous mechanisms do not reflect Chinese interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, but clearly express a review of Chinese approaches in dealing with international and regional security challenges, especially in the most important regions and countries to Chinese interests, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan.

Conclude Remarks

1. There are two important reasons that make the Indian lobby in the United States of America exert pressures for rapprochement between the American administration and the government of India, especially in the era of Trump and during the current American president, Joe Biden: which is what the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi tried to benefit through his rapprochement with the Indian Lobby in Washington, the most important of these reasons:

1. The first reason: The United States, under pressure from the Indian lobby in Washington, is relying too much on India to confront the Chinese rise: Therefore, it is concerned that whoever rules India is a strong government that can efficiently manage the state, and has a right-wing orientation that can rally the people behind it under national claims, and this is something that is not available with any government other than Modi’s government, whether it is formed by the Congress Party, which is historically considered an anti-colonial party despite its dispute with China, or a coalition government that will be weak and unable to take decisive decisions on an issue of this size.

1. The second reason: The great consensus between the President of the United States Donald Trump with a right-wing background and the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which is expected to extend during the current US President Joe Biden era: President Trump will not find someone who integrates with him in policies and trends like Modi, especially since he has a very strong relationship with the “Indian lobby”, which is very important in this context.

1. Beijing supports Pakistan’s diplomacy in its 70-year-old conflict with India over the Himalayan region: As China has amajor infrastructure project in Pakistani Kashmirthat New Delhi claims, So, China is trying to protect its interests in the region by supporting its ally of Pakistan.

1. The occurrence of a Chinese review of some of its constants in security intervention, especially in South Asia and Pakistan, to “combat terrorism in defense of its interests”: There were a set of factors that explain China’s adherence during the past decades to the principle of non-interference and the reduction of the security and military size outside its borders. However, the current stage in the development of the world order, including the widespread spread of Chinese interests in a number of regions, especially in (important regions for China such as Pakistan), the change in the global balance of power, as well as the changes in the nature of Sino-American relations in recent years. All of them impose a Chinese review of some of its foreign policy constants in the security intervention to combat terrorism in defense of its interests, and this explains the Chinese rapprochement with Pakistan to protect the interests of China’s Belt and Road initiative in the economic corridor with Pakistan and the Pakistani port of Gwadar with Chinese investments.

1. Chinese intervention in Pakistan to combat terrorism for targeting the interests of China’s projects in the Belt and Road Initiative to emphasize “China’s rejection of imperialist and Western and American colonial policies” in South Asia and Pakistan: Many Chinese writings claim that the principle of its intervention to protect its economic interests with Pakistan is a form of confirmation of China’s rejection of imperial policies And Western colonialism, and to confirm independence and the differentiation of the Chinese path in political and developmental development, or in other words, as a kind of Chinese defense policy in the face of potential Western interference in Chinese internal affairs. Hence, the reality of Chinese interests and the world order did not both justify continuing to adhere to this principle in its traditional form.

1. In general, there are a group of areas that are expected to be areas of using and employing “Chinese military power” in Pakistan and South Asia:

1. The first area: representing in the (war on terrorism), an area confirmed by the indicators that we have referred to in the research study on the shift away from the principle of non-intervention. 

1. The second area: is (protecting Chinese infrastructure). Although protecting it is the responsibility of the state whose territory lies within that structure, but in the event that the latter is unable to protect it or exposes it to a danger that exceeds its capabilities, China is not expected to remain far from intervening, for reasons related to the (interregional character of the Chinese Belt and Road structure). 

1. The third area: is the (protection of Chinese maritime trade routes). This possibility is confirmed in the light of the (numerous concessions that China has obtained in a number of sea ports, especially Gwadar port in Pakistan).

1. It is clear that Pakistan today is not interested in confrontations with India that will drain its deteriorating economic situation, especially since the new Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan made his declared mission to reform the economy and raise the standard of living of the people, and he shares this trend with China: This was reflected in the recent short confrontation With India, which the Prime Minister of PakistanImran Khan worked to end in the shortest possible time while employing the propaganda aspects in his favor, and who has openly declared his belief thata strong right-wing Indian government led by the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, alone is able to settle the problems between the two countries, especially in Kashmir, which is confirmed by the stability of the relationship between India and Pakistan under the rule of the Indian right led byModi, so despite the ideological and political incompatibility between the two parties, Pakistanis today may be willing to support a government headed byModimore than others to solve the problems between Pakistan and India. 

Finally, the Egyptian researcher believes, as a future outlook, that the alliance between the United States of America and its regional allies in South and Southeast Asia, such as India and others, to abort the Chinese rise, and the (Chinese Belt and road initiative) in the Asian continent harms everyone’s interests: Therefore, it is likely that all parties should intent to and pursue a more pragmatic policy that can guarantee stability In the region and not exhausting it through confrontations, either with China or its close ally Pakistan, which is consistent with China’s policy, which is based on establishing stability as an inevitable ground for economic growth.

8. Study Proposed Recommendations:

1. I.The Egyptian researcher recommends a number of the following measures, in order to protect the interests of all parties in South and Southeast Asia: China, Pakistan, India from terrorist intervention, jihadist tide and the spread of terrorist militias, through:

1. The Egyptian researcher may have understood that the main role of the Indian Lobby in Washington is promoting the policies of Indian power and influence in South and Southeast Asia against China and its ally Pakistan, and focusing on the anti-terror discourse coming from Pakistan against India, but the researcher suggests another solution that the Indian Lobby in Washington can achieve and lead stability in India and the Asian continent, which is the Indian Lobby proposes the idea of ​​equality between India and Pakistan in the region, and the failure to understand that this could limit India’s ambition in South Asia, and the Indian Lobby could change its rhetoric by shifting focus the international and American interest in raising regional cooperation on issues of peace and security in South Asia, and completely moving away from the Indian rhetoric that is in line with Washington and desiring isolating Pakistan and China politically and diplomatically and containing their strategies. 

1. The researcher recommends the necessity ofcooperation between China and India in the field of combating terrorism in South and Southeast Asia, and the search for common aspects of cooperation and managing differences in the region,and this is what actually happened between the two countries, Where theChinese Ministry of Public Security and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs pledged to improve cooperation in combating terrorism between the two countries. Both The Indian and Chinese mentioned ministries in fighting terrorism confirmed that theywill enhance high-level exchanges and implement a high-level meeting mechanism to deal with security and counter-terrorismbetween the Chinese and Indian sides in the Asian region.

1. The Egyptian researcher recommends the necessity of cooperation between the Pakistani and Indian governments in the field of combating fundamentalism and extremist terrorist organizations on the borders between them and in Afghanistan. Hence, coordination between India and China in the field of joint exercises in the field of combating terrorism, developing strategies to combat extremism among Indian and Pakistan youth, especially those who are attracted to the “Islamic State”.

1. What must be emphasized here is that any Chinese review of the principle ofnon-interference and approval of the policy of Chinese security intervention in South Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan to combat terrorist organizations and their linkages with the Chinese province of Xinjiang must be done with great caution not to provoke international and regional parties such as the United States and India: As the researcher think that it is likely that there should be a (pattern or “Chinese version” of the policy of security intervention in Pakistan and on the borders with India, which takes into account the burdens and costs that we have referred to in the study represented by the risks of Chinese relations with the West, the United States and India, And it also takes into consideration the basic concepts that formed the basis of the Chinese role in the global economic system and the Chinese relations with developing and emerging countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially “political unconditionalism, as well as the importance of the economic component of “international responsibility” according to the Chinese concept. And that China will take into account the (rejection of the developing countries of the Western and American experience in interfering in internal affairs, especially the military intervention.

1. The Egyptian researcher views that if India wants to play a regional policing role in fighting the so-called Islamic extremism and the fundamentalist tide, then India should cooperate with the Arab countries and the Islamic world instead of relying heavily on Washington and provoking China regionally in Asia. Therefore, India needs to change the political rhetoric vis-à-vis its Muslim-majority neighbor Pakistan, and to move towards a different discourse that converges more with Arab and Muslim countries, to solve the issue of Indian Muslim minorities in Kashmir, and to stop the expansion of terrorist militias in Asia and their cooperation with the Islamic State “ISIS” in the Middle East region, specifically in Syria and Iraq.

Hence, the Egyptian researcher proposes to the current US administration led by Joe Biden to encourage economic pluralism in the Asian continent and to stop Washington temporarily coaxing the Indian government towards blocking the Chinese “Belt and Road” project to return stability to the Asian region and the world, as the United States is always confirming that China’s maritime expansion poses a threat to Indian maritime routes in the Indian and Pacific oceans, and according to the perspective of the American administration in cooperation with the current Indian government led by Narendra Modi, the progress of Sino-Pakistani relations since 2013, which started with the Chinese-Pakistani Economic Corridor Agreement worries the US and Indian sides. Therefore, the researcher recommends the necessity of economic, trade and investment cooperation between India and China and non-US intervention, for the sake of strategic and economic political stability in the Asian continent.

¹²²

–   References:

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(Accessed January 27, 2021)

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^{) 5(}Shankar Jha, Prem.  (August 13, 2017). “Why India Must Embrace China’s One Belt One Road Plan”, The Wire, India. 

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^{) 7(}Report: “The Pakistani army is strengthening its deployment to secure the economic corridor with China”. (May 20, 2019). Chinese People’s Newspaper, Beijing. 报告：“巴基斯坦军队正在加强其部署，以确保与中国的经济走廊”。 （2019年5月20日）。 中国人民报纸，北京。

^{) 8(}Report: “Beijing promises Islamabad to continue the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.” (November 3, 2018). Chinese People’s Newspaper, Beijing. 报告：“北京承诺伊斯兰堡将继续中巴经济走廊项目。” （2018年11月3日）。 中国人民报纸，北京。

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^{) 10(}Tao, Guang & Yang, Hui. (2017). “The Significance of Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” for Chinese Foreign Policy”, Journal of China and International Relations, Vol. (3), No. (1), China, P.P.53-73. 陶光和杨辉。 （2017）。 “习近平“中国梦”对中国外交政策的意义”，《中国与国际关系学报》，第 （3），第（1）页，中国，第53-73页。

^{) 11(}Chellaney, Brahma. (October 12, 2016). “Sino-Pak nexus shields terror: China has gone all out to guard Pakistan’s patronage of the network”, DNA, India.  

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^{) 71(} Garver,  John. (February 8, 2016). “China and Iran: An Emerging Partnership Post-Sanctions”, Middle East Journal, Middle East Institute (MEI), Washington D.C, USA. 

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^{)  74(}  Gare, Fredric. (2016). War on the Rocks: Nothing Comes without Conditions: China’s Relationship with Pakistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Asian Review of Books, USA.  

⁾⁷⁵⁽ Nazar, Naureen. (September 2016). “Pakistan-China Relations: Combating Terrorism”, Conference: “Pakistan-China Relations in Changing Regional and Global Scenario”, University of Sindh, Pakistan. 

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^{) 77(} Zhan, Hao. (April 22, 2015). “Why Is the China-Pakistan Relation Unique in the World?”, Beyond News Net, Beijing. 詹浩 （2015年4月22日）。 “为什么中巴关系在世界上独一无二？”，超越新闻网，北京。

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^{) 86(  “}The New Silk Road Problem: It needs to solve the threat from terrorism”. (May 5, 2016). Takung Bao, Beijing, China. “新的丝绸之路问题：它需要解决恐怖主义的威胁”。 （2016年5月5日）。 大同报，北京，中国。Available at: http://finance.takungpao.com.hk/hgjj/q/2014/0505/2457376.html (Accessed January 24, 2021)

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^{) 88(}Mu, Ren. (October 2013). “An Analysis on the Contradiction between China’s Non-intervention Policy and Intervention Activities”, 立命館国際関係論集, Journal of Ritsumeikan International Relations, Vol. (13), P.P. 22- 23. 牧人 （2013年10月）。 “中国的不干预政策与干预活动之间的矛盾分析”，立命馆国际关系论集，《立命馆国际关系杂志》，第1卷。 （13），第22-23页。

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^{) 90(}Yizhou, Wang. (2019). Creative Involvement: A New Direction in China’s Diplomacy, People’s Press, Beijing. 王宜州 （2019）。 创造性参与：中国外交的新方向，人民出版社，北京。

^{) 91(}Christensen, Thomas. (August 3, 2006). “China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?”, Remarks Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC, USA. 

^{) 92(} For “an unofficial translation of the Chinese Anti-Terrorism Law”. (December 2015). See: “Counter-Terrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China”. 对于“中国反恐怖主义法的非正式翻译”。 （2015年12月）。 参见：“中华人民共和国反恐怖主义法”。Available  at:  https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/counter-terrorism-law-2015/?lang=en 

^{) 93(}Duchatel, Mathieu.“Overseas Military Operations in Belt and Roads Countries: The Normative Constraints and Legal Framework”, In: Nadege Rolland (ed), Securing the Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Evolving Military Engagement along the Silk Roads”, Routledge, London, P.12.

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^{) 96(}Song, Zhongping. (December 28, 2020). “New national defense law to protect China’s development interests”, View Point, Global Times, China. 宋中平 （2020年12月28日）。 “新的国防法保护中国的发展利益”，《观点》，环球时报，中国。

^{) 97(}Le Miere, Christian. (January 20, 2021). “How China’s defense law changes pave the way for greater globalmilitary influence”, South China Morning Post (SCMP), China. Available at:  https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3118281/how-chinas-defence-law-changes-pave-way-greater-global-military

^{) 98(}Chandler, Clay & Mcgregor, Grady. (February 18, 2021). “Biden’s dream of an Asian ‘mini-NATO’ is a major undertaking”, Fortune’s Newsletter, Section of business and technology in Asia, USA.

^{) 99(}Bhatnagar, Armaan. (January 18, 2021). “Ouad talks: Can ‘Asian Nato’ take on China in Indo-Pacific?”, Times of India, New Delhi. Retrieved From: 

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^{) 100(}Quinn, Jimmy. (October 7, 2020). “An Asian NATO?”, National Review Institute (NRI), Journal of National Review, USA.

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^{) 102(}Panda, Jagannath. (December 31, 2020). “The Elusive Quest for an ‘Asian NATO’”, Strategic Analysis, Routledge Studies on Think Asia, Routledge Taylor & Francais Publishing House, Commentary, USA. 

^{) 103(}Bagchi, Indrani. (March 26, 2020). “Pak-backed Haqqani-LeT Behind Kabul Gurudrwara Attack, Thinks Indian Security Establishment”, Times of India, New Delhi, India. 

^{) 104(}Chaudhuri, Rudra & Shende J, Shreyas. (June 2020). “Dealing With the Taliban: India’s Strategy in Afghanistan After U.S. Withdrawal”, Publications of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Publications Department, Carnegie India. Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, D.C.

^{) 105(}Mashal, Mujib. (February 29, 2020). “Taliban and US Strike Deal to Withdraw American Troops From Afghanistan”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/world/asia/ us-taliban-deal.html (Accessed February 22, 2021)

⁾¹⁰⁶⁽ Nagao, Satoru. (February 2019). “The Growing Militarization of the Indian Ocean Power Game and Its Significance for Japan”, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, International Information Network Analysis, Tokyo, Japan.

^{) 107(}“Pakistan: ‘Common Ground’ Remains Elusive In U.S. Talks”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, (March 31, 2018), USA. Available at:https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-us-common-ground-elusive-in-talks/29137082.html (Accessed February 23, 2021)

^{) 108(}Shriver, Randall (Assistant Secretary of Defense). (September 3, 2018). “US spells out terms of engagement with Pakistan”, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, reported in Anwar Iqbal, Dawn, USA.

^{) 109(}Report: White House Government. (August 21, 2017). “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia”, USA. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/21/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia (Accessed February 25, 2021)

^{) 110(}Pence, Mike. (August 21, 2018). “Donald Trump’s new American strategy for Afghanistan will undo past failures”, USA Today, USA. 

^{) 111(}Mohammed,  Arshad & Landay, Jonathan. (January 4, 2018). “U.S. suspends at least $900 million in security aid to Pakistan”, Reuters, USA. 

^{) 112(}Sigli, M. Mumuni. (September 2017). “China’s non-intervention policy in Africa: Principle versus pragmatism”, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. (11), No. (9), School of Political Science and Public Administration, Shandong University, China. Sigli，M。Mumuni。（2017年9月）。 “中国在非洲的不干预政策：原则与实用主义”，《非洲政治科学与国际关系杂志》，第1卷。 （11），第（9）号，山东大学政治科学与公共管理学院，山东大学，中国。

⁾¹¹³⁽Huihou, An. (Summer 2015). “The Principle of Non-Interference Versus Neo-Interventionism”, Foreign Affairs Journal, Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, No. (104), Beijing, China, P.P. 40- 41. 慧厚 （2015年夏季）。 “无干扰原则与新干预原则”，《中国人民外交学院外事期刊》（第104号），北京，中国，第40-41页。

^{) 114(}  See the joint statement on this quartet security framework agreement between (China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan): “Joint Statement of the Inaugural High-Level Military Leader Meeting on “Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism in Counter Terrorism” by (Afghanistan-China-Pakistan-Tajikistan) Armed Forces”. (August 3, 2016). Xingjian, Urumqi, The Ministry of National Defence of China. Available at: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-08/04/content_4707451.htm

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